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We find that the abnormal trading by small investors is positively related to IPO 
underpricing. In addition to this firm specific investor sentiment, the market wide 
investor sentiment is also positively related with IPO underpricing significantly. 
Investor sentiment is positively related with IPO underpricing for both high and 
low investor sentiment. We show that for harder to arbitrage firms the positive 
relation between IPO underpricing and sentiment is more pronounced. We also 
find that the volatility of IPO underpricing is positively related to investor 
sentiment and infer that it is not only information asymmetry that matters, but also 
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Initial public offerings are important events in the life of a firm because 
this event changes significantly how the firm interacts with regulators, financial 
intermediaries, investors and other stakeholders. Hence a stream of literature has 
sprung up to explain, among other questions, the process it undergoes to go public, 
and the performance of the firm after it goes public. Rational theories propose 
asymmetric information, agency problems between underwriters and issuers, and 
the presence of short sales constraints, as explanations for the pricing of an initial 
public offering (Rock, 1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 
1989; Welch, 1989; and Miller, 1977). They focus mainly on examining the 
valuation of the stock at the offer, pricing of the stock at the end of the first day of 
trading, and performance of the stock in the long run.  
Recent behavioral finance theories postulate that behavioral biases of 
investors, for example the sentiment of investors, drive the price of an IPO during 
the first day of trading (Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh, 2006; Cornelli, Goldreich 
and Ljungqvist, 2006; Derrien, 2005). These papers suggest that IPO underpricing  
increases with the demand from sentiment investors. 1
                                                 
1 Notable exception is Rajan and Servaes (2003) who argue that sentiment should be negatively 
related to underpricing as underwriters take into account the demand from sentiment investors and 
ajust offer price upwards. 
 One reason is because 
issuers underprice the IPOs relative to the aftermarket prices to compensate 
regular investors for the risk they face if sentiment suddenly drops and they are 
stuck with overpriced shares (which would have been dumped on sentiment 
investors had the sentiment remained high) (Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh, 2006). 
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Another reason for this positive relationship is that issuers underprice the IPOs 
relative to the aftermarket price to mitigate the risk of providing costly price 
support in the aftermarket if the market price drops below the offer price in the 
initial period of trading (Derrien, 2005). 
Extant literature implies that sentiment investors come and leave the 
market together and, thus, the IPO pricing process is impacted by market wide 
sentiment. In this paper we use measures of market-wide sentiment based on the 
results from two well established surveys conducted by the University of 
Michigan and Confidence Board; namely, the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) 
and the Index of Consumer Confidence (CBIND). These surveys document the 
responses of consumers’ about their perception of the strength of the US economy. 
One of the objectives of the surveys is to capture the level of optimism or 
pessimism in the consumers mind about the future strength of the US economy. A 
second objective is to gain an understanding of the consumers’ attitudes about the 
business climate in the US, the consumers’ personal finances, and their spending 
habits. Taking the two objectives together, the surveys can also be a measure of 
the consumers’ optimism or pessimism about asset prices, especially equity. 
Indeed, these surveys have been used by prior literature to proxy for investor 
sentiment and have been related to equity prices (Lemmon and Portniaguina, 
2006). Consumers’ optimism or pessimism about the future economic activity in 
the US will in part reflect their optimism or pessimism about IPOs in the economy. 
Using these new measures, we examine whether consumers’ confidence about the 
future of the US economy impacts the IPO pricing process. 
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We study a sample of 5,198 US IPO firms over the period 1981 to 2009. 
Since it is likely that consumer sentiment measures the behavioral biases of 
consumers as well as the fundamentals of the US economy, we follow Lemmon 
and Portniaguina (2006) and orthogonalize the ICS and the CBIND to a broad set 
of macroeconomic variables. After removing the impact of fundamentals, the 
remaining residual is our empirical proxy for investor sentiment. We relate 
investor sentiment to IPO valuation, IPO offer price revision, IPO underpricing, 
the monthly volatility of IPO underpricing, and IPO long-run returns.  
We find that IPO underpricing increases with market-wide investor 
sentiment. IPO underpricing is positively related with investor sentiment for both 
high and low investor sentiment. This suggests that the relationship is not 
confined to only high sentiment as proposed by prior literature. Since not all firms 
are prone to sentiment in the same degree, we show that for harder to arbitrage 
firms the positive relation between IPO underpricing and sentiment is more 
pronounced. The influence of investor sentiment on IPOs is stronger for high tech 
firms, young firms, and firms with lower institutional holding, or higher R&D 
expenditure, or lower sales, or lower profitability. We find that the volatility of 
IPO underpricing is positively related to investor sentiment and infer that it is not 
only information asymmetry that matters but also the degree of excess optimism 
or pessimism of investors in the market. We also find that the long-run returns of 
IPO is negatively related to investor sentiment, probably because high investor 
sentiment causes high aftermarket price, and leads to low long-run returns when 
the share price returns to the fundamentals as time goes by.  
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Three prominent papers empirically examine the relation between IPO 
underpricing and sentiment (Derrien, 2005; Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist, 
2006; and Dorn 2010). These papers utilize unique characteristics of the European 
IPO markets in which retail demand for IPOs is observable. They use the demand 
from retail investors as their empirical proxy for firm specific investor sentiment. 
In the same spirit, we use the abnormal trading by retail investors in the first day 
of the IPO as our proxy of firm specific investor sentiment in the sample of US 
IPOs. We find that the abnormal trading by small investors is positively related to 
IPO underpricing consistent with the results by Derrien (2005), Cornelli, 
Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006) and Dorn (2010). After controlling for this firm 
specific investor sentiment, the market wide investor sentiment remains positively 
related with IPO underpricing in statistically significant and economically 
meaningful way. Overall, our results show that market wide investor sentiment 
derived from consumer sentiment metrics, is positively related to different aspects 
of the IPO pricing process. 
One possible concern is that the market wide sentiment is a monthly 
measure and this causes valuation and underpricing of IPOs in the same month to 
be not independent.  We correct for this in two ways. First, we cluster residuals by 
month, and second, we average the dependent and independent variables in the 
regressions in each month, and estimate the regressions with the month as the unit 
of observation. We find that sentiment is positively related to underpricing similar 
to the results reported for the pooled cross sectional sample above. In addition, the 
number of IPOs is not the same in each month. We control for this issue with a 
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weighted least squares, where the weight is the inverse of the number of IPOs in 
each month. We also control for influential observations, and adjust for the 
differences of the internet bubble period, and our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
Our contributions are manifold. This is the first paper to provide evidence 
that the pricing of IPOs is influenced by the market-wide sentiment in addition to 
the firm-specific sentiment. Moreover, we provide further evidence that difficult-
to-arbitrage firms are more affected by the sentiment as suggested by Baker and 
Wurgler (2006). In addition to the above primary contributions, we make three 
secondary contributions. First, our proxy is derived from consumer surveys, and 
thus is unambiguously exogenous, whereas retail trading volume is subject to 
criticism as being possibly endogenously determined. For example, speculative 
retail investors may flock to the market when they anticipate high IPO 
underpricing. Second, we confirm that the impact of firm-specific IPO sentiment 
is present in the US IPO market which differs from European IPO markets along 
several non-trivial dimensions. Finally, we apply the analysis to the period of 
1981 – 2009 and not just the years surrounding the “IPO bubble”; the period not 
representative of general IPO conditions. Hence, we generalize the previous 
results along these three dimensions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 shows the results of the robustness check. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
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2 Literature review and research questions 
2.1 Rational investor models in the IPO literature  
 Theoretical and empirical research has espoused several rational reasons 
for the presence of IPO underpricing and valuation. Rock (1986) for example 
provides a winner’s curse explanation for underpricing. He argues that 
underpricing is necessary to attract uninformed investors to participate in the IPO 
process because of rationing of the issue and information asymmetry among 
investors. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggested that issuers (through 
investment bankers) are interested in acquiring private information that informed 
investors have about their valuation and propensity and degree of participation in 
the IPO process. To acquire this private information issuers underprice the IPO. 
The empirical evidence is generally supportive of this theory (e.g. Hanley, 1993). 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) 
propose a signaling theory for the existence of IPO underpricing, and interpret 
underpricing as a signal of firm quality. However, the empirical evidence on 
signaling is mixed (Jegadeesh, Weinstein, Welch, 1993; Michaely and Shaw, 
1994; Welch 1996). Banerjee, Hansen and Hrnjic (2010) extend Stoughton and 
Zechner (1998)’s model and propose that underwriters use the book-building 
process to secure a promise from  institutional investors to buy and hold IPOs for 
a long period of time. To enforce this promise issuers of IPOs underprice the issue 
such that institutional investors break even in the long run. Goyal and Tam (2010) 
find the supporting evidence. 
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Rational investor models explaining IPO underpricing usually assume that 
the aftermarket price is an unbiased estimate of the IPO firms’ fundamentals. 
However, Miller (1977) argues that the price of the IPO is likely to be set by the 
most optimistic investors in the aftermarket. Pessimistic investors are likely to be 
excluded from the market because of short-sale constraints. If issuers assume that 
the market is rational and that the aftermarket price is set by the average investor 
rather than the marginal investor who is optimistic then they are likely to 
underprice the IPO. This model provides a starting point for the role of different 
types of investors in the IPO pricing process. 
2.2 Behavioral investor models in the IPO literature 
 Recently, behavioral explanations of the underpricing have become 
popular. Based on prospect theory, Loughran and Ritter (2002) explain the 
presence of IPO underpricing from an agency conflict perspective. Issuers are 
dependent on underwriters to help them price the issue, whereas, underwriters 
want to minimize their costs and effort, example marketing costs, in obtaining 
information about the willingness of the market participants to invest in the IPO. 
Hence, underwriters intentionally suggest a lower price than can be obtained by 
issuers. Meanwhile, issuers also go along with the underpricing and are willing to 
leave money on the table, because they anchor on the midpoint of filing price 
range. The offer price suggested by the underwriters is higher than the midpoint 
of the filing range and the benefit from positive offer price revision is generally 
larger than the loss from leaving money on the table. In agreement, Ljungqvist 
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and Wilhelm (2005) find that IPO issuers are less likely to switch the underwriter 
when they are “satisfied” as predicted by this behavioral measure. 
 Derrien (2005) develops a model of IPO pricing where underwriters 
extract private information from informed institutional investors and observe 
public information about investor sentiment. In this model high investor sentiment 
is only partially incorporated into the offer price because underwriters are 
committed to provide costly price support if aftermarket price falls below the 
offer price. This makes underwriters conservative in setting the offer price leading 
to underpricing of the IPO. Using a sample of 62 French IPOs underwritten by 
modified bookbuilding procedure during the period 1999 to 2001, Derrien (2005) 
finds that investor sentiment (proxied by the oversubscription of the fraction of 
the IPO allocated to individual investors) is positively related to underpricing. 
Even though Derrien (2005) proposes sentiment as an explanation of his findings, 
he admits that retail investors in his sample may be fully rational. 
Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) model the optimal response of an 
issuer to the presence of sentiment investors who arrive in two stages. They 
assume that sentiment investors trade on sentiment and regular investors trade on 
fundamentals. Following the agreement with the underwriter, regular investors 
hold the IPO shares for the long run in order to resell them to sentiment investors 
who arrive in the second stage of the model. If investor sentiment falls afterwards 
(and sentiment investors do not arrive in the second period), the IPO regular 
investors would suffer from the change in sentiment as they would be stuck with 
overpriced shares. To compensate regular investors for this probable loss, issuers 
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underprice the IPO. The authors also predict that underpricing would increase 
with sentiment, because issuers would increase their offer size to maximize the 
funds raised in the issue. Regular investors hold a greater proportion of their 
portfolio in this expanded issue and need to be compensated for tying up 
additional funds in the IPO. Hence, the issuer would underprice the issue more 
during high sentiment periods.  
Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006) empirically examine the 
relationship between investor sentiment and post-IPO prices. Their proxy for 
investor sentiment is the pre-IPO (or “grey”) market prices that are available in 
Europe. Using a sample of 486 IPOs in 12 European countries between November 
1995 to December 2002, the authors document a positive relation between the 
grey market prices (investor sentiment) and post IPO prices. They rightfully 
conjecture that IPO pricing process might be influenced by the market-wide 
sentiment as well as the firm-specific retail investor sentiment. However, their 
choice of market index return as a proxy for market sentiment seems unusual2
In a similar vein, Dorn (2010) utilizes the German “when-issued” IPO 
market trades in the period 1999 to 2000 and finds that IPOs characterized by 
aggressive retail trading have higher first day returns and lower long-run returns. 
He argues that sentiment investors are present in the market even after the bubble 
 and, 
not surprisingly, it is insignificant (and sometimes even negative) in their analysis. 
On the contrary, we show a strong influence of the market-wide sentiment as well 
as the firm-specific sentiment. 
                                                 
2 They admit that the “market returns are at best a noisy proxy for investor sentiment” (p. 1205). 
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crash. This is consistent with our finding that sentiment impacts IPOs even in the 
low sentiment periods. 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) take a different approach and 
examine how IPOs are priced relative to their seasoned peers. They find that IPOs 
are overpriced by 14 – 50% at the offer. More overpriced IPOs have higher first 
day returns and lower long run returns. They argue that overvaluation is due to the 
overly optimistic growth forecasts that fail to realize in the long run. 
As mentioned above, Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006) and Dorn 
(2010) utilize “when-issued” market for IPO shares in European IPO markets and 
use it as a proxy for investor sentiment. However, Aussenegg, Pichler and 
Stomper (2006) argue instead that prices from “when-issued” European markets 
are proxy for the information gathering activities prior to the bookbuilding. This 
evidence is consistent with the model from Jenkinson, Morrison and Wilhelm 
(2006) who observe that “interpretation of securities laws in Europe (as compared 
with the US) allows the exchange of information between investors and the 
issuing bank prior to the bookbuilding period”. In agreement with this, Jenkinson 
and Jones (2004) find no evidence of information gathering during the 
bookbuilding in European IPOs.3
                                                 
3 Their finding is at conflict with Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2002)’s analysis of European IPOs 
and SEOs. 
 Aussenegg et al (2006)’s interpretation is also 
broadly consistent with the evidence from the US in the spirit of Hanley and 
Hoberg (2010)’s argument that information produced during the premarket due 
diligence (prior to the bookbuilding) is an alternative to information gathered 
during the costly bookbuilding process. 
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Another possible concern is that retail investor demand is endogenous and 
unobservable in the US (where “grey” market does not exist). For example, it has 
been argued that retail investors are more speculative (Odean, 1998) and it is 
possible that they flock to the “grey” market when they anticipate high 
underpricing. If that is the case, high retail participation does not cause high 
underpricing, but anticipated high underpricing attracts high retail participation. 
Our survey proxy is free of these concerns as it is exogenous and observable (and 
known well in advance). Regardless of these issues, we control for the small 
trader abnormal volume and still find statistically significant and economically 
meaningful impact of overall market sentiment. 
While all of the above papers posit that the firm specific sentiment is 
influencing IPO pricing process in Europe, concerns remain about generalizing 
their results to other IPO markets and other time periods. 
For example, the samples from above papers are from the years 
surrounding the formation and the burst of the Internet bubble when the behavior 
of IPO market participants was atypical (e.g. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). 
Ofek and Richardson (2003) argue that abnormal presence of retail investors in 
the “bubble” years contributed to the formation of Internet bubble. It is safe to say 
that these years are anomalous and not representative of IPO markets in general 
and any findings should be interpreted with the caution.  
Also, Jenkinson, Morrison and Wilhelm (2006) report that differences 
between European and US IPO markets are non-trivial. For example, there is an 
exchange of information early in the process in European IPOs, unlike US IPOs 
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where exchange prior to registration is strictly prohibited. In the US, analysts are 
allowed to produce the research only after quiet period ends (40 days after the 
issue), whereas European analysts (many of them affiliated with the underwriter) 
may start producing research right after the underwriter is appointed. Another 
difference is that the initial price range in the US is non-binding and half of US 
IPOs are priced outside of initial price range, whereas this fraction is only 10% in 
Europe4
Differences in timing of communication and the flexibility of initial price 
range may impact the sensitivity of the IPO process to the sentiment and it is not 
obvious that US IPO markets should behave like European. However, our results 
in the US sample confirm the previous findings from Europe.  
.  
2.3 Investor sentiment literature 
 Sentiment investor trade based on noise (sentiment) rather than on 
fundamental information (Black, 1986). In classical finance theory, investor 
sentiment has no role in setting prices because arbitrageurs take positions that are 
opposite to those taken by sentiment investors and drive them out of the market. 
However, Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldamann (1990) model continual 
generations of sentiment investors in conjunction with limits to arbitrage cause 
asset prices to deviate from fundamentals. Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that 
not only do prices deviate from fundamentals for the whole market, but, this 
effect is more prominent for hard to value and arbitrage stocks, for example, small 
                                                 




firms, young firms, growth and value firms, non dividend paying firms, and loss 
making firms. Prior literature has measured investor sentiment in terms of a 
market variable, for example, closed end fund discount (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 
1991), or a combination of market variables, for example, the principle 
component from closed end fund discount, first day IPO returns, number of IPOs 
in a month, proportion of equity in capital structure, turnover, and dividend 
premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Another set of popular measures of market 
sentiment are surveys, for example, Conference Board Consumer Confidence 
Index, Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and their components (Lemmon and 
Portniaguina, 2006). A second survey that prior literature has used is one that is 
conducted by the American Association of Individual Investors. Individual or 
retail investors are most often touted to be sentiment investors and this survey 
tries to directly measure over or under optimism of sentiment investors. Using a 
vector autocorrelation regression model, Brown and Cliff (2004) document that 
investor sentiment is strongly correlated with contemporaneous market returns but 
not with near-term market returns. A third survey that has been used in the 
literature is the Investor Intelligence Survey. Brown and Cliff (2005) use the bull-
bear spread as a sentiment variable, which is defined as the percentage of bullish 
minus the percentage bearish respondents in this survey and find that there is a 
negative relation between sentiment and long-run stock returns. In an effort to 
validate the different sentiment measures, Qiu and Welch (2004) compare each of 
the measures with the UBS/Gallup investor sentiment survey and test which 
measure best predicts small firm performance. They conclude that Conference 
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Board Consumer Confidence Index, Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and 
their components are the best performers. 
2.4 Consumer surveys and IPO pricing process 
Firstly, IPO underpricing increases with investor sentiment. The offer size 
hypothesis proposed by Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) argues that 
underwriters increase underpricing when investor sentiment is high, because 
regular investors require higher compensation for holding more inventories when 
offer size is larger as a result of higher sentiment. The price support hypothesis 
developed by Derrien (2005) asserts that underwriters do not incorporate all 
favorable information into the offer price when investor sentiment is high, which 
leads to higher underpricing. Secondly, investor sentiment influences IPO 
underpricing asymmetrically. High sentiment periods are characterized by heavy 
presence of sentiment investors. They, generally, do not participate in low 
sentiment periods. Thirdly, Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that more difficult-
to-arbitrage IPOs are more susceptible to investor sentiment. This predicts that 
high tech firms, younger firms, firms with lower fraction of institutional holdings, 
lower sale, lower R&D expense and lower profitability in the fiscal year before 
IPOs, are more easily affected by investor sentiment.  
3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection 
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The initial sample contains all US IPOs from 1981 to 2009 in Securities 
Data Company (SDC) which are 11,570 observations. To improve data accuracy, 
we also incorporate Ritter’s correction file identifying IPO mistakes in SDC 
(“Corrections to Security Data Company’s IPO database”) from Ritter’s website5
3.2 IPO underpricing variables 
. 
Two observations are excluded, which are identified as “non-IPO” based on 
information contained in the Ritter’s correction file. We also find some errors 
regarding the midpoint of the filing range in SDC, wherein the high price in the 
filing range is missing and midpoint of filing range is set equal to 50% of the offer 
price. Thirteen observations are excluded with erroneous midpoint of the filing 
range. Unit offerings (1,237 observations), closed-end funds (1,017 observations), 
partnerships (119 observations), ADRs (119 observations), and REITs (250 
observations) are excluded from our sample. Utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999; 134 
observations), and financials (SIC codes 6000-6999; 1,189 observations) are also 
excluded, because these industries are regulated by the government and have 
special rules that govern the IPO process. 2,292 IPOs are excluded because of 
incomplete information for variables that are included in the baseline underpricing 
regression. Our final sample consists of 5,198 US IPOs from 1981 to 2009.  
We describe the variables that are related to the characteristics of the IPO 
process. Underpricing is the percentage change in the price between the offer 
                                                 
5  We thank Jay Ritter for generously sharing IPO data on his website, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/, 
including the file about IPO mistakes correction (“Corrections to Security Data Company’s IPO 
database”), the file about IPO founding year (“Founding dates for 8,823 IPOs from 1975-2008”)  




price and the first-day closing price. The first-day closing price is the first 
recorded closing price available in CRSP if it is within 7 days of the offer date as 
reported from SDC. Volatility is the standard deviation of the underpricing for all 
the IPOs in each month, similar to the measure developed by Lowry, Officer, and 
Schwert (2010). 
3.3 IPO valuation at the offer date 
To examine how underwriters value IPOs relative to their peers, we 
construct comparable firms based on P/Vsales and P/Vebitda following 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004). Specifically, we choose a publicly traded 
non-IPO firm in the same industry which has comparable sales and EBITDA 
profit margin and did not go public within the past three years. To select a 
matching firm, we start with all firms in Compustat for the fiscal year prior to the 
IPO year. Then we eliminate firms that went public during the past three years, 
firms whose securities traded are not ordinary common shares, REITs, closed-end 
funds, ADRs, and firms with a stock price less than five dollars as of the prior 
June or December, whichever is later. We then group firms into the 48 Fama and 
French (1997) industries, based on SIC codes in CRSP at the end of the previous 
calendar year. Within every industry, we group firms into 3 portfolios based on 
past sales; within every industry-sales portfolio, we group firms again into 3 
portfolios based on past EBITDA profit margin. We then slot each IPO into one 
of these nine portfolios and then select the Non IPO firm with the closest sales 
within the matched portfolio as the IPO firm. If the matched firm cannot be 
obtained with this 3X3 classification, we use 3X2 and 2X2 classifications along 
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the same lines. After finding the matching firms for all IPOs, we compute two 
price-to-value ratios, P/Vsales and P/Vebitda, following equations (1) to (6) 
described below. For the IPO sample, we use shares outstanding at the close of 
the offer date. For the matching firms, we use market price and shares outstanding 
at the close of the day immediately prior the IPO offer date. The above three 
variables are taken from CRSP. 
 
SalesYear  FiscalPrior 
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EBITDAYear  FiscalPrior 
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SalesYear  FiscalPrior 











                              (3) 
 
EBITDAYear  FiscalPrior 
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3.4 Survey based proxies for market-wide investor sentiment 
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Next, we turn to variables related to survey based proxies for investor 
sentiment. ICS is the Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed by University of 
Michigan Survey Research Centre. CBIND is the Index of Consumer Confidence 
constructed by the Conference Board. These two indexes are used in Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006) and shown to be influential measures of investor sentiment 
by Qiu and Welch (2004). The survey for the Index of Consumer Sentiment by 
University of Michigan begins in 1947 on a quarterly basis and changes to 
monthly basis from January 1978. The survey is conducted on a sample of at least 
500 households and the respondents are asked to answer about fifty core questions, 
about their perception of current economic conditions, which comprise the Index 
of Current Economic Condition, about the expectation of the economy, which 
comprises the Index of Consumer Expectation, and the state of the consumers 
own personal finances. The survey for the Index of Consumer Confidence 
collected by the Conference Board begins on a bimonthly basis in 1967 and 
changes to a monthly survey from January 1978. The survey is conducted using a 
sample of 5,000 households, which is a larger sample compared with the sample 
in the Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment. Similar to the ICS the 
respondents are asked questions regarding their perception of the current and 
future economic prospects in the US. 40% of the weight of the index comes from 
the respondents’ opinion of current economic conditions and the remaining 60% 
from the respondents’ opinions about the future of the US economy.  
The consumer sentiment survey values reflect consumers beliefs about the 
fundamentals of the economy as well as their over optimism or pessimism 
19 
 
(investor sentiment). Since we need to measure the excess optimism or pessimism, 
it is important to remove the effect of fundamentals from the raw survey values. 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) provide an empirical model that allows us to 
separate the sentiment from economic fundamentals. We regress Michigan’s 
Consumer Sentiment Index and Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index 
on a set of variables that proxy for fundamental economic activity and estimate 
the following equation.  
 
URATELABORCONSGDPYLDDEFDIVCS 76543210 3 αααααααα +++++++=
        εαα +++ CAYCPI 98                                                            (7)    
         
Fundamentals of the economy are measured using a set of nine 
macroeconomic variables. We follow Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and 
measure the macroeconomic variables in the same manner as they did. These are 
dividend yield, default spread, yield on the treasury bill, GDP growth, 
consumption growth, labor income growth, unemployment rate, CPI, and 
consumption to wealth ratio. 
Dividend yields (DIV) is measured as the total ordinary cash dividend of 
the CRSP value-weighted index over the last three months deflated by the value 
of the index at the end of the current month. The value of the index is the CRSP 
value-weighted returns monthly index both with and without dividend, as in Fama 
and French (1988) and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006). Default spread (DEF) 
is measured at a monthly frequency, and is the difference between the yield to 
maturity on Moody’s Baa-rated and Aaa-rated bonds, taken from the Federal 
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Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 6  YLD3 is the monthly yield on the three-month 
Treasury bill, taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. GDP growth 
(GDP) is measured as 100 times the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of 
adjusted GDP (to 2005 dollars).7,8 Consumption growth (CONS) is measured as 
100 times the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of personal consumption 
expenditures. Labor income growth (LABOR) is measured as 100 times the 
quarterly change in the natural logarithm of labor income, computed as total 
personal income minus dividend income, per capita and deflated by the PCE 
deflator. Unemployment rate (URATE), URATE is the monthly and seasonally 
adjusted values as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.9
The residual from the above equation is termed ICSR and CBINDR 
respectively when the consumer sentiment variable is ICS and CBIND. The 
 The inflation rate 
(CPI) is measured monthly and obtained from CRSP. Consumption-to-wealth 
ratio (CAY) is taken from data provided by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). We 
measure sentiment at a monthly frequency and some of the macroeconomic 
variables are already at a monthly frequency. However, others like GDP growth, 
consumption growth, labor income growth and consumption-to-wealth ratio, are 
available at a quarterly frequency and thus take on the same value for all the 
months in a particular quarter. 
                                                 
6 The website for Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis is http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. 
7 Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) adjust GDP to 1996 dollars but we adjust GDP to 2005 dollar 
since the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Bureau of Economic Analysis have revised and 
updated their data and adjusted GDP to 2005 dollars.  
8 For all the quarterly macroeconomic variables (GDP, CONS, LABOR and CAY), the quarterly 
change from January 1 to April 1 is the GDP growth for January, February and March. The 
quarterly change from April 1 to July 1 is the GDP growth for April, May and June. The quarterly 
change from July 1 to October 1 is for July, August and September. The quarterly change from 
October 1 to January 1 the next year is for October, November and December. 
9 The website for Bureau of Labor Statistics is http://www.bls.gov/.  
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residual denotes the excess optimism or pessimism of consumers and is our proxy 
for investor sentiment. 
From the continuous variable (ICSR) representing investor sentiment, we 
obtain a dummy variable. ICSR_ABVM is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of one if ICSR for that month is greater than the median of the ICSR distribution. 
We define a similar variable for the CBINDR distribution and term it 
CBINDR_ABVM.  
3.5 Trading based proxies for firm specific investor sentiment 
In this section we describe variables related to orderflow of small traders, 
where, the abnormal orderflow of small traders proxies for investor sentiment for 
that IPO. We use trade size to classify traders into small traders. Previous 
literature suggests that this classification maps quite well to that of trading by 
individuals. Lee (1992) reports survey-based evidence that most of the 
transactions by individuals are of small dollar value He also argues that while 
large traders may break their orders into medium size, for a variety of reasons 
they do not trade in very small lots. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) compare the 
size-based classification of investors to the actual identities obtained from the 
TORQ database where the identity of the traders are clearly identified, and find 
that trade size does a good job of separating individuals trades from trades by 
institutions.  Not surprisingly, a large number of papers have used trade size as a 
proxy for small versus large investors (see, for example, Battalio and Mendenhall, 
2005; Bhattacharya, 2001; and Chakravarty, 2001).  
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Admittedly, the use of trade size may not provide as clean an evidence on 
the trading behavior of individuals as that documented from the detailed datasets 
used in some prior studies (for example, Odean, 1998; and Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2001 use the exact identity of the investors). However, such detailed 
datasets cover only limited time periods of two or three years. The use of the well-
accepted trade size proxy allows us to examine the influence of sentiment of small 
investors over a longer time period of 1994-2008. This measure of investor 
sentiment is similar in spirit to the proxy for investor sentiment in Derrien (2005) 
i.e., the fraction of the IPO issued to retail investors, and to the proxy for investor 
sentiment in Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006), and Dorn (2009) i.e., 
‘grey market’ pre IPO trading. These authors argue, as we do, that investor 
sentiment impacts prices through trading by noise traders, who are usually 
thought to be retail investors (for example, Kumar and Lee, 2006).  
We use the Trade and Quotation (TAQ) dataset which contains 
information about each executed trade for each stock. When the dollar amount of 
a trade is less than or equal to $5,000, we assume the trade is executed by a small 
investor and is consistent with the prior literature (Bhattacharya, 2001). Defining 
small trades using such a low cutoff allows us to minimize the impact of large 
traders splitting their trades into small lots and being classified as small investors. 
However, since the dollar trade size would be large for high-priced stocks even 
for small trade lots, we follow Asthana et al. (2004) and modify the above 
classification for stocks whose prices exceed $50. For these stocks, we classify 
trades below 100 shares as trades by small investors. To ensure that our results are 
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not driven by stock price movements around the event date, the dollar values of 
all trades associated with an IPO are calculated by using the average of the daily 
share prices during the third month after the IPO.  
After identifying trades executed by small investors, we follow the 
methodology developed by Lee and Ready (1991) to classify each trade as either 
buyer-initiated (i.e., a buy) or seller-initiated (i.e., a sell). The Lee-Ready 
algorithm matches a trade’s execution price to the most recent quote. If the trade’s 
execution price is above (below) the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, it is classified 
as a buy (sell). In case where the trade execution price is at the mid point of the 
bid-ask spread, the trade is classified based on a “tick-test”. An up-tick classifies a 
trade as a buy and a down-tick as a sell. We only consider the trades executed 
between 9:30am and 4:00pm, since the exact time of execution and quotes 
become less reliable outside of the normal market hours. 
We define order flow, NetBuy, as the difference between the number of 

















 We then follow Asthana et al. (2004) and define the 
abnormal order flow of small investors for IPO i on event date t which is the first 
trading date after the IPO date as ANetBuyi,t that is computed as follows. 
    (8) 
where µi and σi are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the 
daily order flow of the investor group for the IPO during the estimation period. 
The estimation period ranges from day +30 to day +60 relative to the event date. 
                                                 
10 Our results remain robust if we measure order flow in terms of dollar volume of shares traded 
instead of number of shares traded. 
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Since there is no “grey market” in the US, and hence ex-ante retail trading and 
prices of IPOs are unobservable, we have no option but to use ex-post data to 
proxy for investor sentiment that previous literature has used. Thus there is a look 
ahead bias in the measurement of the trading based sentiment variable. Note that 
ANetBuyi,t is not our main variable of interest, but rather control variable for the 
firm-specific sentiment empirically examined in several related studies in 
European IPO samples. Hence, we feel it is justified to use it in our context; i.e. to 
control for previous findings. 
Another possible concern is that in recent years, practice of splitting orders 
has become common. Specifically, large orders from institutions are split into 
small orders. Our algorithm to identify small traders based on trade size may 
result in misclassification of large traders as small traders and introduce noise in 
the measurement of small trader sentiment However, this will bias the results 
towards the null hypothesis; i.e. it will work against finding significant results. 
3.6 Control Variables 
To delineate the impact of investor sentiment, we control for other known 
determinants of IPO underpricing that have been documented by prior literature. 
Revision is the percentage change from the midpoint of the filing range to the 
offer price. Hanley (1993) showed that underwriters partially adjust the price 
during the book building process and Revision is positively related to 
underpricing. Lowry and Schwert (2004) show that the impact of partial 
adjustment is asymmetric between upward and downward revision. Thus, we 
define Revision+ as equal to Revision if Revision is positive, and zero otherwise. 
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Underwriter ranks are defined as in Carter and Manaster (1990), and updated by 
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). Underwriter 
ranks data are obtained from Ritter’s website. MaxRank is the maximum of all the 
lead managers' ranks.11
                                                 
11 In unreported regression, we substitute MeanRank, the mean of all the lead managers’ ranks, but 
the results are qualitatively the same.  
 Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark and Singh 
(1998) document a negative relation between underwriter ranks and underpricing. 
However, Beatty and Welch (1996) report that the negative correlation reverses 
itself after 1990s. Loughran and Ritter (2004), Hansen (2001), Fernando, Gatchev, 
and Spindt (2005) also document a positive relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing after 1990. To control for the difference in time 
periods, we use MaxRank_BF1990 which is equal to MaxRank if the IPO is issued 
before 1990, zero otherwise. Age is the number of years between the founding 
year and the IPO year. Founding year information is also obtained from Ritter’s 
website. ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is 
the sales of the prior fiscal year before offering from Compustat. HiTech equals to 
one if the IPO firm is in the high tech industry, zero otherwise. Venture equals to 
one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. Loughran and 
Ritter (2002), Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu (2003) find that venture 
capital backing is associated with higher underpricing, however, Lowry and Shu 
(2002), Li and Masulis (2005), Megginson and Weiss (1991) document a negative 
relation between venture capital backing and underpricing. NASDAQ equals to 
one if the IPO is listed on NASDAQ, zero otherwise. Bubble equals to one if the 
IPO occurs between September 1998 and August 2000, zero otherwise (Lowry 
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and Schwert, 2004). Age is the number of years between the IPO year and the 
founding year, taken from the Field-Ritter database on Ritter’s website. Studies 
find underpricing falls as firm age rises (Lowry and Shu, 2002; Cliff and Denis, 
2006; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; and Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991). 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for all the variables used in study. 
For the full sample, mean overvaluation is P/Vsales=2.887, and P/Vebitda=3.228 
This shows that IPOs are overvalued on average above their peer group. The 
mean and median UnderPricing are 20.60% and 7.71% which are statistically 
different from zero. The average volatility of the underpricing (Volatility) in a 
month has a mean of 20.95% and median of 15.02%. The mean and median 
reputation of the lead underwriter (MaxRank) are 7.299 and 8; mean and median 
Age of the IPO is 14.911 and 8; the mean and median number of shares offered 
(ShrOffer) are 4.644 and 2.750 million shares. These numbers are comparable to 
prior studies. Since we are interested in how investor sentiment impacts the IPO 
pricing process, we split the sample into the high sentiment (top third of the 
sentiment distribution) and low sentiment (bottom third of the sentiment 
distribution) based on ICSR. We see that overvaluation at the offer date is high 
during high sentiment periods (P/Vsales=1.474, and P/Vebitda=1.455) and low 
during low sentiment periods (P/Vsales=1.509, and P/Vebitda=1.398). The 
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difference median in relative valuation between the high and low sentiment 
periods however is not significant. For companies going public in the high 
sentiment periods, the average underpricing (Underpricing) is 27.74% 
(median=9.09%). In contrast, the average underpricing for firms going public in 
low sentiment periods is only 13.71% (median=6.82%). The difference in the 
average underpricing is 2.27% and is statistically significant (p-value=0.000). 
Further, the difference in average volatility of underpricing (Volatility) between 
high sentiment periods (mean=23.51%, median=14.74%) and low sentiment 
periods (mean=17.41%, median=15.52%) is mixed and not statistically significant. 
The average revision (Revision) in price from the midpoint of the filing range to 
the offer price is positive (mean=3.29%, median=0.00%) for IPOs offered in the 
high sentiment periods whereas, it is negative (mean=-0.88%, median=0.00%) for 
IPOs offered in the low sentiment period. The difference in medians is also 
significant. We also find that a greater number of hi-tech (HiTech) firms go public 
in high sentiment periods than in low sentiment periods. Further, younger firms 
go public in high sentiment periods than in low sentiment periods. The average 
AGE is 13.921 years (median 7 years) during high sentiment periods, whereas, 
average Age is 16.115 years (median=9 years) during low sentiment periods. 
Figure 1 presents the time variation of monthly average underpricing and monthly 
Index of Consumer Sentiment. The solid line is the time variation of monthly 
average underpricing and the dashed line is time variation of Index of Consumer 
sentiment. Both average underpricing and Index of Consumer Sentiment peak in 
28 
 
the bubble years. After 1990, average underpricing and Index of Consumer 
Sentiment seem to coincide with each other. 
4.2 Sentiment and IPO valuation at the offer date 
 Theoretical literature in behavioral finance suggests that underwriters set 
the offer price to take advantage of the prevailing market sentiment, however, 
they do not set offer prices to fully incorporate the effects of sentiment. Thus they 
leave some money on the table by way of underpricing in the post offer market. 
These models suggest that the offer price is increasing in sentiment. We test 
whether managers set the offer price higher (lower) for IPO firms in high (low) 
sentiment periods to take advantage of the prevailing sentiment. As described in 
Section 3.3 we adopt the methodology suggested by Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004), and construct comparable firms. The two overvaluation 
metrics of interest are P/Vsales and P/Vebitda. These measure the excess 
valuation of the IPO firm over a comparable non IPO firm. The following 
regression model is estimated to test the relation between sentiment and valuation 
of IPO firms. 
 
Overvaluation = α0 + α1 ICSR + α2 ANetBuy + α3 MaRank + α4 MaxRank_BF1990 
+ α5 HiTech+ α6 Venture + α7 Nasdaq + α8 Age + α9 DecShrOffer+ α10 Sales+ 
α11Year + ω                                                                                                             (9) 
 
 Table 3 presents the result of testing the relationship between valuation at 
the offer date and investor sentiment. Both P/Vsales and P/Vebitda are winsorized 
at 1% level to remove the impacts of outliers. We see that P/Vsales and P/Vebitda 
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are positively and significantly associated with investor sentiment (ICSR). This is 
consistent with arguments made by Derrien (2005), and Ljungqvist, Nanda and 
Singh (2006), that underwriters set the offer price more aggressively when 
investor sentiment is high. This result holds after controlling for other factors 
which are likely to impact overvaluation. We see that over valuation,is positively 
related with hi-tech (HiTech) firms, firms backed by venture capitalists (Venture), 
and firms on the NASDAQ. Hi-tech firms are glamorous stocks and the market 
overvalues these stocks compared with non hi-tech stocks. This could be because 
greater proportion of retail investors trade in such stocks attracted by their 
glamour status. Similar to arguments about underwriter reputation, IPOs backed 
by venture capitalists (Venture) who are thought to be informed investors enjoy a 
premium at issue. Further, prior literature suggests that NASDAQ stocks which 
are smaller and belong in greater proportions to hi-tech industries have higher 
valuations. We find that overvaluation decreases with age (Age), suggesting that 
more mature firms are easier to value.   
4.3 Sentiment and IPO offer price revision 
            In section 4.2, the empirical results show that investor sentiment affects 
IPO valuation at the offer price. Before setting the final offer price, IPO firms 
need to submit the tentative filing price to SEC. Thus, investor sentiment probably 
has impacts on the price revision, from the original filing price to the final offer 
price. In this section, we describe the results of examining the relation between 
investor sentiment and IPO offer price revision. We estimate the following 




Offer Price Revision = α0 + α1 ICSR + α2 ANetBuy + α3 MaRank + α4 
MaxRank_BF1990 + α5 HiTech+ α6 Venture + α7 Nasdaq + α8 Age + α9 
DecShrOffer+ α10 Sales+ α11Year + ω                                                                 (10) 
 
Table 4 presents the empirical results of testing the association between 
offer price revision and investor sentiment. Offer price revision is found to be 
positively related with investor sentiment, but the relationship is insignificant. 
Maxrank is positively and significantly related with offer price revision, which 
means underwriters with higher reputation may be able to revise the offer price up 
at a larger magnitude. Hi-tech firms and younger firms are found to have larger 
offer price revision, probably because these firms are more subject to investor 
sentiment.  
4.4 Sentiment and underpricing 
In this section we describe the results from estimating a multivariate 
regression of IPO underpricing on investor sentiment after controlling for other 
determinants of IPO underpricing shown to be significant by prior literature. We 
estimate the following regression to implement the above test. 
 
Underpricing = α0 + α1 ICSR + α2 ANetBuy + α3 Revision + α4 Revision+ + α5 
MaxRank + α6 MaxRank_BF1990 + α7 HiTech + α8 Venture + α9 Nasdaq + α10 
Age  + α11 DecShrOffer + α12 Sales + ω                                  (11) 
 
Underwriters increase the offer size of the IPO when sentiment is high to 
obtain higher financing. When the offer size increases, the underwriter increases 
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underpricing, because regular investors require higher compensation for holding 
larger inventory of the IPO in their portfolio (Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh, 2006). 
Further, underwriters do not incorporate all favorable information into the offer 
price because there is a non- zero probability that they would need to provide 
costly price support in the aftermarket (Derrien, 2005), and thus, underpricing 
increases with sentiment. Table 5 shows the results of estimating the above 
equation (11). The treatment variable is ICSR which is our proxy for investor 
sentiment. We see that ICSR is significant and positive (coefficient=0.006, t-
stat=7.63). This shows that as sentiment increases underpricing also increases. 
This lends support to the arguments put forward by Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh 
(2006), and Derrien (2005), that underwriters do not fully incorporate the effect of 
sentiment into the offer price. Further, to compensate regular investors who do not 
sell their stock in the short run, underpricing increases in sentiment.  
We also see that ANetBuy which represents the abnormal buying behavior 
of small investors, as measured by trade size, is positively related to underpricing 
(coefficient=0.002, t-stat=7.15). Retail investors are usually thought of to be 
sentiment investors (Lee, 2001). This suggests that as retail investors’ demand 
increases, they drive up the price of the IPO and underpricing increases. Further, 
this also suggests that underwriters do not fully incorporate the demand by retail 
investors into the offer price since retail investors do not participate in the book 
building process.  
Revision is positively and significantly related with underpricing 
(coefficient=0.332, t-stat=4.09), and this is consistent with the partial adjustment 
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phenomenon suggested by Hanley (1993) and Lowry and Schwert (2004). 
Underwriters need to compensate informed investors by underpricing the IPO, to 
extract favorable private information from the informed investors during the 
book-building process. This leads to a greater amount of underpricing of the IPO 
if a greater amount of favorable information is extracted (i.e. higher revision in 
prices from the midpoint of the registration range). However, underwriters only 
need to pay for positive private information, because investors are willing to 
reveal negative private information to underwriters for free, in order to enjoy a 
lower offer price. Thus the relation between price revision and underpricing is 
higher for positive price revisions than for negative price revisions. The positive 
relation between REVISION+ and underpricing suggests that indeed this is the case 
(coefficient=1.062, t-stat=4.45).  
Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) document 
a negative relation between underwriter ranks and underpricing, using data from 
1979 to 1983 and from 1979 to 1991 respectively. These two papers argue that 
prestigious underwriters select less risky IPOs and their reputation serves as a 
signal of firm quality, thus reducing underpricing. We find that the coefficient on 
MaxRank_BF1990 is negative and significant consistent with findings by Carter 
and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998). However, Beatty and 
Welch (1996) and Loughran and Ritter (2004), report that the negative correlation 
between underwriter rank and underpricing reverses in the 1990s. Hansen (2001) 
justifies the positive relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing 
based on the efficient contract theory. He suggests that more speculative offerings 
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are associated with higher underpricing and also with more prestigious 
underwriters during the 1990s. Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) argue that 
high underwriter reputation is a signal of high issuer quality, and underpricing 
measures the level of new positive information provided to the market about the 
quality of the issuer. Consistent with the findings described above we find 
evidence of a positive relationship between MaxRank and underpricing for the 
period after 1990. Coefficients on other control variables are consistent with the 
literature: high tech firms (HiTech), IPOs backed by venture capitalists (Venture) 
and companies listed on Nasdaq exchange (NASDAQ) have higher underpricing. 
The coefficient on Age is negative and significant suggesting that older firms have 
lower underpricing. The coefficients on the offer size of the IPO (DecShrOffer) 
and sales are also negative and significant. 
The empirical evidence above shows that IPO underpricing is positively 
related with investor sentiment. However, Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) 
predicted that only with the presence of sentiment investors in a hot IPO market 
will IPO underpricing increase with investor sentiment. In contract, they 
suggested no underpricing in a cold market. Miller (1977) also implied that IPO 
aftermarket prices would be set by moderate investors who valued the IPOs at the 
fundamentals if sentiment investors are pessimistic, because at this time moderate 
investors would offer higher prices (equal to the fundamentals) to buy the IPO 
shares than pessimistic investors did (lower than the fundamentals). Cornelli, 
Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006) also suggested that when small investors were 
pessimistic, bookbuilding investors would not sell their shares to small investors, 
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leading to a weak relation between small investor sentiment and IPO aftermarket 
prices. Thus, possibly this positive relation between investor sentiment and IPO 
underpricing only holds when investor sentiment is high, if the IPO prices are set 
by sentiment investors in hot markets and by rational investors in cold markets. 
But meanwhile, we have to note that the asymmetric effects may not show up in 
our empirical data, because possibly there are always sentiment investors in the 
IPO market, and hence, IPO prices are affected by investor sentiment in both hot 
and relatively cold markets. In this case, we can also predict the relation between 
investor sentiment and IPO underpricing is stronger in hot market with high 
sentiment. In column [3] and [4] of Table 5, we examine these prediction by 
interacting ICSR and ICSR_ABVM. The interaction term is positively and 
significantly related with underpricing, showing that the impact of sentiment on 
underpricing is stronger in hot market, as predicted.  
4.5 Cross sectional (Sub sample) Analysis 
This section documents results relating to the cross sectional differences in 
the impact of sentiment on IPO underpricing. Baker and Wurgler (2007) suggest 
that difficult-to-arbitrage stocks are more susceptible to investor sentiment. We 
classify difficult-to-arbitrage stocks as those which are in the high tech industry, 
young firms, firms with a lower fraction of institutional holdings, firms with 
lower sales, firms with higher R&D expenditure and firms with a lower 
profitability in prior fiscal year before IPOs. Growth and profitability of such 
stocks are harder to assess and hence these stocks are more difficult to value and 
arbitrage. Therefore, the effect of sentiment on underpricing is likely to be higher 
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for difficult to arbitrage stocks. We define HiTech stocks as defined in SDC, 
young firms as firms below median of the Age distribution, lower institutional 
ownership as stocks below the median of the institutional holdings reported in 
13F filings at the end of the first quarter after the IPO. Similarly, firms below the 
median of the sales in the year before the IPO as firms with lower sales, firms 
above the median of the R&D expenditure as high R&D firms, and firms below 
median profitability as low profitability firms.   
Table 6 summarizes the results of estimating Eq. 11 for each of the 
subsamples described above. Panel A describes the results for estimating Eq. 11 
for high tech firms and non-high-tech firms. Column 1 describes the results for 
high tech firms; and column 2 for non-high-tech firms; column 3 describes the 
test of equality of the coefficients for high tech and non high tech firms 
subsamples. The coefficient on our sentiment measure ICSR is 0.01 for high tech 
firms and is significant (t-stat = 9.53). For non-high-tech firms, the coefficient on 
sentiment is only 0.003, and is significant (t-stat = 4.86). The difference in the 
two slope coefficients between high tech firms and non-high-tech firms is 0.007 
and is significant (t-stat=5.85). These results are consistent with the conjecture by 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) that sentiment has a greater impact on hard-to-
arbitrage firms. Panel B to Panel F are analysis based on firm age, institutional 
holding fraction, firm size, R&D expenses and profitability, respectively. We find 
that the relation between market sentiment (ICSR) and underpricing are stronger 
for hard-to-arbitrage stocks than for easy-to-arbitrage stock, i.e. the coefficient on 
sentiment for young firms, firms with a lower fraction of institutional holdings, 
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firms with lower sales, firms with higher R&D expenditure and firms with a lower 
profitability in prior fiscal year before IPOs is higher and significantly so, than the 
coefficient on sentiment for old firms, firms with higher fraction of institutional 
holding, firms with higher sales, firms with lower R&D expenditure, and firms 
with higher profitability. Interestingly, coefficients on institutional holding 
fraction, age, sales, and profitability are in hypothesized direction, but not 
significant. Collectively these results suggest that sentiment plays a stronger role 
in determining underpricing for hard-to-arbitrage stocks. 
4.6 Sentiment and volatility of underpricing 
 Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010) suggest that pricing IPOs is very 
complex and is driven to a large extent by the information asymmetry between 
issuers and suppliers of capital. This leads to a high degree of variance in the 
pricing of IPOs each month. During high sentiment periods there are more 
sentiment investors in the market. These investors do not participate in 
bookbuilding and it is hard for the underwriter to predict their demand schedules. 
Hence, we conjecture that the underwriters will have more pricing errors during 
the high sentiment months. Thus, we hypothesise that the standard deviation in 
IPO underpricing will be positively related to the sentiment. We test this 
conjecture by denoting the standard deviation of the underpricing of all IPOs 
issued during the month (Volatility) as the dependent variable. The main test 
variable is investor sentiment and this is the same number each month. Predicted 
Mean ANetBuy and Residual Mean ANetBuy are contained by regressing Mean 
37 
 
ANetBuy on ICSR. Other control variables are the monthly averages of the control 
variables for each IPO during a month. The following regression describes the test. 
 
Volatility = α0 + α1 ICSR + α2 Predicted Mean ANetBuy + α3 Redisual Mean 
ANetBuy+ α4 Mean Revision + α5 Mean Revision+ + α6 Mean MaxRank + α7 
Mean MaxRank_BF1990 + α8 Mean HiTech + α9 Mean Venture + α10 Mean 
Nasdaq + α11 Mean Age + α12 Mean DecShrOffer + α13 Mean Sales + ω           (12) 
 
Table 7 summarizes the results of estimating Eq (12). We find that 
sentiment is positively related to volatility of IPO underpricing (coefficient=0.003, 
t-stat=2.19). This suggests that different underwriters assess the demand from 
market wide retail sentiment investors differently and this leads to higher 
variability in the IPO underpricing. Further, other control variables are also 
related to the volatility of IPOs in predictable directions. We find that higher the 
revision lower is the volatility in IPOs. Further, higher is the mean revision 
upward, higher is the volatility in IPO underpricing. The coefficient on Revision is 
negative but small in magnitude as compared with the coefficient on Revision+, 
which is consistent with different underwriters being able to gather different 
amount of private information from the book building process. Mean MaxRank of 
the underwriter is negatively related to the volatility in IPO underpricing. This 
suggests that as the average reputation of the underwriter increases, they are able 
to better estimate the demand for the IPO and/or better act as a signal of IPO firm 
value to the market, thereby, reducing information asymmetry between issuers 
and suppliers of capital. We also find that when there are more high tech firms 
going public during a particular month, the variation in underpricing increases. 
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This is consistent with the conjecture that high tech stocks are harder to value 
because the information asymmetry for these stocks is higher. Other control 
variables are not significantly related to the variation in IPO underpricing.  
4.7 Sentiment and long-run returns 
In the previous sections, investor sentiment has been showed to affect IPO 
valuation at the offer price, underpricing and volatility of underpricing. However, 
sentiment on IPOs may fade out because more and more information about the 
IPO firms is released over time. This may cause the share prices of the IPO firms 
to return to the fundamental, leading to low long-run returns (Ritter, 1991). Table 
8 shows the result of exploring the relationship between investor sentiment and 
IPO long-run returns by running the following regression. 
 
Long-run Return = α0 + α1 ICSR + α2 ANetBuy + α3 MaxRank + α4 Venture + ω 
(13) 
Long-run returns are defined as the buy-and-hold return of the IPO firms 
measured from the end of the first aftermarket trading day until 2, 3, 6, or 12 
months later less the buy-and-hold return on CRSP value-weighted portfolio, 
following Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006). ICSR and ANetBuy 
represent market and firm-specific sentiment separately. Carter, Dark and Singh 
(1998) and Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006) suggest that IPO long-run 
performance is positively related to the underwriter’s reputation, so MaxRank is 
included as a control variable. Brav and Gompers (1997) and Cornelli, Goldreich 
and Ljungqvist (2006) also show that IPO long-run returns also increase with the 
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presence of venture capitalists, and hence venture dummy is controlled in the Eq. 
13. In Table 8, IPO long-run returns are found to decrease with market sentiment 
ICSR, in three panels with different control variables and in all columns with 
different time frames, consistent with our prediction. However, firm-specific 
sentiment ANetBuy is found to have no impact on long-run returns. MaxRank and 
Venture are positively correlated with long-run returns, consistent with prior 
research results.  
5 Robustness tests 
5.1 Correlation among IPOs issued in the same month 
We have documented so far that IPO underpricing increases with investor 
sentiment. However, the sentiment variable is the same for all the firms going 
public within the same month. We address this issue in two ways. First we run 
monthly regressions, and secondly, we cluster errors by month to control for cross 
correlation of error terms in a month.   
5.1.1 Monthly regressions 
In this section we describe the results from estimating monthly regressions of Eq. 
(11). We take the averages of all the variables both dependent and independent 
variables described in Eq. (11) across all IPOs during a month. Since the 
sentiment measure is the same for all IPOs in the month, the resultant average 
sentiment is different across months. Table 9 shows the results from estimating 
Eq. (11) for the averages of the underpricing and control variables. Columns 1 
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and 2 include all months; columns 3 and 4 use the number of IPOs within one 
month as the weight in the regression;12 columns 5 and 6 drop months with fewer 
than 2 IPOs.13
5.1.2 Cluster analysis 
 In all the columns, the results show that market wide sentiment 
(ICSR) is positively and significantly correlated with monthly mean underpricing 
(coefficient=0.002, t-stat=2.47). This is consistent with results tabulated using the 
full sample. 
 Another way to control for cross correlation between IPOs issued during a 
month is to cluster error terms by month. We estimate Eq. (11) after clustering 
standard errors by month. Table 10 describes the results from this estimation. We 
find that market sentiment (ICSR) is positively related to underpricing similar to 
results described for the full sample in Table 5. The coefficient on ICSR is 0.006 
and the t-stat is 5.04. 
5.2 Controlling for Future Corporate Profits and Consumer Spending 
Another concern is raised about our proxy for investor sentiment (ICSR). 
We have removed the macro-economic effects from our raw sentiment measures 
by regressing ICS on a set of current and lag macro-economic variables, 
following Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006). However, it is still possible that the 
residual from this regression reflects future corporate profits and consumer 
spending in a rational way instead of representing investor sentiment. Thus, we 
construct additional sentiment variables by regressing ICS and ICSR on future 
                                                 
12 We use the AWEIGHT option in STATA 
13 We use a cut off of 2 IPOs per month because it is the decile of the distribution. 
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corporate profits and consumer spending separately, and label the predicted 
values as ICS_P and ICSR_P and the residual as ICS_R and ICSR_R accordingly. 
The future corporate profits and consumer spending variable are collected from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, following Qiu and Welch (2004). Further, we run 
the regression of Eq. 11 again using these additional sentiment variables. Table 11 
presents the results and shows that all of the four variables constructed are 
positively and significantly related with underpricng, which suggest that ICS 
affects underpricing through both rational and behavioral ways.  
5.3 Alternative Sentiment Measures 
5.3.1 Reduced Baker-Wurgler Index 
The positive relationship between IPO underpricing and investor 
sentiment that we document so far uses survey measures of market wide investor 
sentiment. Another prominent measure of investor sentiment that could be a 
candidate in studying the relation between IPO underpricing and market sentiment 
is the one developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) (see Campbell, Du, Rhee and 
Tang, 2008). The Baker Wurgler index of market sentiment uses observable 
metrics from the stock market. However, IPO related variables play a prominent 
role in the construction of this index which leads to a mechanical relationship 
between IPO underpricing and market sentiment. Nevertheless, in an effort to be 
comprehensive in our choice of market sentiment proxies, we purge the IPO 
related variables from the Baker Wurgler index and use this reduced index as the 
measure of investor sentiment.  
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Specifically, the Baker Wurgler index is based on six measures of investor 
sentiment: closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, number of IPOs, first 
day returns on IPOs, share of equity issues in total debt and equity issues, and 
dividend premium (the log difference of the average market-to-book ratios of 
payers and non-payers). Each of these six measures is first regressed on 
macroeconomic variables that capture variations in the business cycle, namely 
growth in industrial production index, consumer durables, consumer nondurables, 
and consumer services. The residuals from the above six regressions are then 
extracted and the overall sentiment index is the first principal component of these 
residuals. The index is standardized to yield a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) illustrate that this sentiment 
index lines up well with anecdotal accounts of investor exuberances and panics. 
They also validate the index by providing evidence of the link between the index 
and the time series variation in the cross-sectional returns that cannot be explained 
by rational risk-based models. Examining the index closely we see that there are 
three proxies for sentiment that are related to IPO activity. This will cause a 
mechanical relationship between IPO underpricing and the Baker Wurgler index. 
Hence, we adjust the Baker Wurgler index by excluding proxies related with IPO 
activities and use the same methodology as Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) to 
calculate the reduced Baker Wurgler index. We substitute this reduced Baker 
Wurgler index in the place of ICSR as the measure of market sentiment. Table 12 
describes the results from estimating Eq. (11) with the Baker Wurgler index as the 
measure of sentiment. We see that the coefficient on adjusted Baker Wurgler 
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index is positive and significant without ANetBuy as the control variable. 
However, after controlling for ANetBuy, BWrd becomes insignificant. This is 
consistent with our findings using ICSR as the measure of sentiment.  
5.3.2 AAII Investor Sentiment Measure 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) suggest that consumer sentiment and 
investor sentiment are highly correlated with each other, and hence sentiment 
measures ICSR and CBINDR from consumer surveys can be used as proxy for 
investor sentiment. However, another promising measure is the investor sentiment 
measure from the survey constructed by American Association of Individual 
Investors, which is also used as investor sentiment proxy in Brown and Cliff 
(2004, 2005). The association asks each participant whether they think the stock 
market will be in 6 months: up, down, or the same, and labels these responses as 
bullish, bearish, or neutral, respectively. The bull-bear spread can be used as a 
direct measure of investor sentiment. I use this alternative sentiment measure and 
construct additional sentiment variables to reexamine the relationship between 
investor sentiment and IPO underpricing. AAIIR is the residual from regressing 
AAII on macro variables as those in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006). AAIIR_R 
and AAIIR_P are the residual and the predicted value accordingly from regressing 
AAIIR on future corporate profits and consumer spending from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, following Qiu and Welch (2004). Table 13 shows that AAII 
and AAIIR are positively and significantly related with IPO underpricing, but this 
coefficient turns to be insignificant after future corporate profits and consumer 
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spending has been controlled. This suggests that AAII may only reflect rational 
and fundamental factors, instead of investor sentiment.  
5.4 Alternative Definition of Abnormal Order Flow 
We have proposed abnormal order flow (ANetBuy) as proxy for firm-
specific investor sentiment measure. However, there is no consensus in the 
literature about the definition of abnormal order flow. In the previous sections, we 
use the order flow of the IPO firms in the window [+30, +60] after IPO date as the 
benchmark. In this section, we firstly use the matching-firm approach, in which 
ANetBuy_Match equals to the netbuy of IPOs by small investors on the first 
trading date in TAQ minus the netbuy of matching firm by small investors on the 
same date. The matching firms are found following Purnanadan and Swaminathan 
(2004), as those in Table 3. Secondly, netbuy is standardized to represent the 
firm-specific investor sentiment on the IPO firms. NetBuy_Standardize equals to 
the netbuy of the IPO firm deflated by the sum of buy and sell orders of the IPO 
firm. Table 14 describes the results of using alternative firm-specific measures 
ANetBuy_Match and NetBuy_Standardize to examine the impact of investor 
sentiment on IPO underpricing. Both variables are positively and significantly 
correlcted with underpricing, showing that firm-specific investor sentiment affects 
IPO underpricing. Meanwhile, the coefficient of market sentiment measure ICSR 
remains positive and significant, meaning that market sentiment matters for IPO 
underpricing besides firm-specific investor sentiment.  
5.5 Bubble Period 
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We have documented thus far that underpricing increases with investor 
sentiment. However, our sample period includes an incredible bull run as well as 
a subsequent crash of the Tech Bubble. Since the impact of market sentiment on 
IPO pricing process is more pronounced for high tech stocks, it is possible that 
our overall results are driven by this specific time period. We interact the variable 
Bubble (equals one if the IPO occurs between September 1998 and August 2000, 
and zero otherwise) with market sentiment (ICSR) to control for the differential 
impact of sentiment on the IPO pricing process during this period. In 
supplementary regressions we find that sentiment (ICSR) is positively related with 
underpricing, with a coefficient of 0.002 and t-stat of 3.78. This implies that even 
in the non-bubble period, there is a positive relation between underpricing and 
investor sentiment. The interaction term of ICSR and bubble is also positively and 
significantly associated with underpricing (coefficient=0.028, p-value=8.90), 
which implies that the impact of sentiment on underpricing is stronger in bubble 
period.  
5.6 Influential Observations 
Although our sample spans over 5,000 observations it is possible that the 
empirical results are driven by a small number of influential observations. To 
identify influential observations we follow Belsley, Kun and Welch (1980). We 
drop 8 observations each with the highest and smallest distance values. We find 
that the relation between investor sentiment and IPO underpricing remains 
positive and significant (coefficient=0.006, t-stat=11.84).  
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5.7 Other robustness tests 
 Abnormal retail trading volume measure is subject to criticism as indirect 
measure of sentiment. We rerun all our regressions omitting this firm specific 
sentiment measure. In unreported regression 14
6. Conclusion  
, all results are qualitatively 
unchanged and all the coefficients on market wide sentiment have same or higher 
level of significance. 
We examine the impact of market wide sentiment and firm specific 
sentiment on the IPO pricing process. Extant theoretical literature implies that 
sentiment investors come and leave the market together and, thus, the IPO pricing 
process is impacted by market wide sentiment. However, empirical literature, 
possibly due to data limitations or a lack of appropriate proxy, has not been able 
to document this impact of market wide sentiment. We bridge this gap between 
theoretical and empirical work and show evidence that IPO pricing process in 
influenced by market-wide sentiment in addition to the firm specific sentiment as 
documented in the previous literature. 
Our measures of market-wide sentiment are based on the results from two 
well established surveys conducted by the University of Michigan and Confidence 
Board; namely, the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) and the Index of 
Consumer Confidence (CBIND). These surveys are orthogonalized on 
macroeconomic variables to remove the impact of market fundamentals as 
                                                 
14 All unreported regressions mentioned in the paper are available from the authors upon request. 
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suggested by prior academic literature. For the firm specific sentiment, we use the 
measure similar to previous empirical studies; namely, the abnormal trading by 
retail investors in the first day of the IPO. 
We find that the abnormal trading by small investors is positively related 
to IPO underpricing consistent with the results by Derrien (2005), Cornelli, 
Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006) and Dorn (2010). After controlling for this firm 
specific investor sentiment, the market wide investor sentiment remains positively 
related with IPO underpricing in statistically significant and economically 
meaningful way. We show that for hard to arbitrage firms the positive relation 
between IPO underpricing and sentiment is more pronounced. We also find that 
the volatility of IPO underpricing is positively related to investor sentiment. 
This is the first paper to provide empirical evidence that the pricing of 
IPOs is influenced by the market-wide sentiment in addition to the firm-specific 
sentiment. Moreover, we provide further evidence that difficult-to-arbitrage firms 
are more affected by the sentiment as suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2006). In 
addition to the above primary contributions, we make three secondary 
contributions. First, our proxy is unambiguously exogenous, whereas retail 
trading volume is subject to criticism as being possibly endogenously determined. 
Second, we confirm that the impact of firm-specific IPO sentiment is present in 
the US IPO market which differs from European IPO markets along several non-
trivial dimensions. Finally, we apply the analysis to the period of 1981 – 2009 and 
not just the years surrounding the “IPO bubble”; the period not representative of 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
 
This table describes the sample selection procedure. The initial sample contains all US 
IPOs from 1981 to 2009 in SDC. Two observations are excluded, which are identified as 
“non-IPO” based on information in Ritter’s correction file, “Corrections to Security Data 
Company’s IPO database”. Thirteen observations are excluded, with problematic 
midpoint of filing price in SDC. Unit offering, closed-end fund, partnership, ADRs and 
REITs are also excluded from the sample. Utility issuers and finance issuers are excluded 
because they are probably regulated by the government. IPOs without complete 
information in the baseline underpricing regression are excluded. The final sample 
consists of 5198 US IPOs from 1981 to 2009. 
 





All US IPOs from 1981 to 2009 in SDC 11570   
Exclude observations identified as "non-IPO" according to 
Ritter's correction file 11568 2 
Exclude observations with problematic midpoint of filing 
price in SDC 11555 13 
Exclude Unit Offering 10318 1237 
Exclude Closed-end Fund 9301 1017 
Exclude Partnership 9182 119 
Exclude ADRs 9063 119 
Exclude REITs 8813 250 
Exclude Utility Issuers, with SIC codes 4900-4999 8679 134 
Exclude Financial Issuers, with SIC codes 6000-6999 7490 1189 
Exclude observations without complete information in the 

















Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper. Column [1] 
is for the full sample. Column [2] is for the subsample with sentiment measure ICSR 
above the 66th percentile of the ICSR distribution. Column [3] is for the subsample with 
sentiment measure ICSR below the 33rd percentile of the ICSR distribution. Column [4] 
is the result of Wilcoxon rank sum test for the two subsamples. Underpricing is the 
percentage change in the price between the offer price and the first-day closing price. 
P/Vsales is the price-to-value ratio based on sales, calculated following section 3.3. 
P/Vebitda is the price-to-value ratio based on EBITDA, calculated following section 3.3. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the underprcing for all the IPOs in each month. 
ICSR is the market wide sentiment measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment 
constructed by University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on 
macroeconomic variables. ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of small investors for 
IPO on the first trading date after the IPO date. Revision is the percentage change from 
the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. MaxRank is the maximum of all the 
lead managers’ ranks. HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero 
otherwise. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, zero 
otherwise. Nasdaq equals to one if the IPO is listed on Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age is the 
number of years between the founding year and the IPO year. ShrOffer is the number of 
shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the prior fiscal year before 
offering from Compustat, in billion. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. 
 
  Full Sample ICSR_ABVP66 ICSR_BLWP33 
Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum Test 





Underpricing 20.60% 7.71% 27.74% 9.09% 13.71% 6.82%   2.27%*** 0.000 
P/Vsales 2.887 1.503 2.867 1.474 2.925 1.509    -0.035 0.445 
P/Vebitda 3.228 1.453 3.273 1.455 3.259 1.398     0.057 0.907 
Volatility 20.95% 15.02% 23.51% 14.74% 17.41% 15.52%    -0.78% 0.444 
ICSR 0.437 0.807 7.834 6.582 -8.691 -7.350 13.932*** 0.000 
ANetBuy -6.688 -0.631 -0.313 0.779 -13.590 -3.447   4.226*** 0.000 
Revision 0.89% 0.00% 3.29% 0.00% -0.88% 0.00%   0.00%*** 0.000 
MaxRank 7.299 8.000 7.359 8.000 7.292 8.000    0.000 0.277 
HiTech 0.396 0.000 0.449 0.000 0.347 0.000   0.000*** 0.000 
Venture 0.433 0.000 0.428 0.000 0.446 0.000    0.000 0.280 
Nasdaq 0.727 1.000 0.727 1.000 0.728 1.000    0.000 0.950 
Age 14.911 8.000 13.921 7.000 16.115 9.000 -2.000*** 0.000 
ShrOffer 4.644 2.750 4.391 2.925 4.859 2.600    0.325* 0.063 
Sales 0.188 0.026 0.144 0.022 0.159 0.031 -0.009 0.000 








Table 3. Investor Sentiment and IPO Valuation at the Offer Price 
 
This table presents the results of testing the relationship between valuation at the offer 
date and investor sentiment. The dependent variables are the price-to-value ratios, 
calculated following Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004). P/Vsales is the price-to-
value ratio based on sales. P/Vebitda is the price-to-value ratio based on EBITDA. ICSR 
is the market wide sentiment measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed 
by University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on macroeconomic 
variables. ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of small investors for IPO on the first 
trading date after the IPO date. MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead managers’ ranks. 
MaxRank_BF1990 equals to MaxRank if the IPO is issued before 1990, zero otherwise. 
HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero otherwise. Venture 
equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. Nasdaq 
equals to one if the IPO is listed on Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age is the number of years 
between the founding year and the IPO year. DecShrOffer takes the values from 1 to 10, 
by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for the IPOs in the same year. ShrOffer is the number of 
shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the prior fiscal year before 
offering from Compustat, in billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, ** and *** represents 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. t-statistics are included below the 
coefficients.  
 
 P/Vsales P/Vebitda 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
ICSR 0.018 0.024 0.030* 0.047* 
 1.64 1.43 1.87 1.93 
ANetBuy  0.000  0.000 
  0.02  0.12 
MaxRank 0.009 -0.011 -0.025 -0.048 
 0.18 -0.16 -0.36 -0.47 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.086**  -0.096*  
 -2.32  -1.89  
HiTech 0.771*** 0.975*** 1.116*** 1.395*** 
 4.55 4.30 4.50 4.17 
Venture 0.555*** 0.728*** 0.956*** 1.091*** 
 3.34 3.02 3.80 2.96 
Nasdaq 0.494*** 0.712*** 0.717*** 1.007*** 
 3.11 3.30 3.27 3.26 
Age -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 
 -7.95 -6.52 -7.47 -7.37 
DecShrOffer 0.136*** 0.145*** 0.108** 0.106 
 3.55 2.69 2.03 1.34 
Sales -0.173*** -0.140*** -0.165*** -0.127*** 
 -3.06 -3.07 -2.92 -2.78 
Year 0.008 0.001 0.029 0.019 
 0.47 0.06 1.25 0.58 
Constant -14.306 -0.858 -55.030 -36.372 
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 -0.41 -0.02 -1.20 -0.54 
Number of Obs 3088 1891 3088 1891 














































Table 4. Investor Sentiment and Offer Price Revision  
This table presents the results of testing the relationship between offer price revision and 
investor sentiment. The dependent variable is the offer price revision, which is the 
percentage change from the midpoint of the filing prices to the offer price. ICSR is the 
market wide sentiment measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed by 
University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on macroeconomic 
variables. ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of small investors for IPO on the first 
trading date after the IPO date. MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead managers’ ranks. 
MaxRank_BF1990 equals to MaxRank if the IPO is issued before 1990, zero otherwise. 
HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero otherwise. Venture 
equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. Nasdaq 
equals to one if the IPO is listed on Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age is the number of years 
between the founding year and the IPO year. DecShrOffer takes the values from 1 to 10, 
by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for the IPOs in the same year. ShrOffer is the number of 
shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the prior fiscal year before 
offering from Compustat, in billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, ** and *** represents 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. t-statistics are included below the 
coefficients. 
 [1] [2] 
ICSR 0.001 0.001 
 1.54 1.36 
ANetBuy  -0.001*** 
  -4.13 
MaxRank 0.011*** 0.013*** 
 6.12 5.06 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.010***  
 -6.56  
HiTech 0.076*** 0.094*** 
 10.79 10.53 
Venture 0.003 0.017* 
 0.44 1.89 
Nasdaq 0.002 -0.011 
 0.30 -1.02 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -6.21 -5.52 
DecShrOffer 0.003** 0.002 
 2.14 1.12 
Sales 0.001 0.002 
 0.51 1.21 
Year -0.001* -0.002* 
 -1.87 -1.84 
Constant 2.773* 3.741* 
 1.81 1.78 
Number of Obs 5037 3462 
R-Square 0.06 0.07 
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Table 5. Investor Sentiment and IPO Underpricing  
 
This table presents the result of testing the relationship between IPO underpricing and 
investor sentiment. The dependent variable is underpricing, which is the percentage 
change in the price between the offer price and the first-day closing price. ICSR is the 
market wide sentiment measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed by 
University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on macroeconomic 
variables. ICSR_ABVM equals to one if ICSR is above the median of the ICSR 
distribution. ICSR*ICSR_ABVM is the interaction term of ICSR and ICSR_ABVM. 
ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of small investors for IPO on the first trading date 
after the IPO date. Revision is the percentage change from the midpoint of the filing 
range to the offer price. Revision+ equals to one if the Revision is positive, zero otherwise. 
MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead managers’ ranks. MaxRank_BF1990 equals to 
MaxRank if the IPO is issued before 1990, zero otherwise. HiTech equals to one if the 
IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero otherwise. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is 
backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. Nasdaq equals to one if the IPO is listed on 
Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age is the number of years between the founding year and the 
IPO year. DecShrOffer takes the values from 1 to 10, by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for 
the IPOs in the same year. ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the IPO, in 
millions. Sales is the sales for the prior fiscal year before offering from Compustat, in 
billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. t-statistics are included below the coefficients.  
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
ICSR 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 11.06 7.63 5.16 2.71 
ICSR*ICSR_ABVM   0.005** 0.006* 
   2.46 1.76 
ANetBuy  0.002***  0.002*** 
  7.15  7.07 
Revision 0.248*** 0.332*** 0.247*** 0.330*** 
 3.87 4.09 3.86 4.09 
Revision+ 1.089*** 1.062*** 1.086*** 1.059*** 
 5.28 4.45 5.26 4.44 
MaxRank 0.006* 0.016*** 0.006* 0.015*** 
 1.67 3.30 1.65 3.21 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.012***  -0.013***  
 -6.14  -6.34  
HiTech 0.066*** 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.075*** 
 5.54 4.62 5.53 4.54 
Venture 0.028*** 0.033** 0.027** 0.033** 
 2.58 2.17 2.54 2.16 
Nasdaq 0.020** 0.037** 0.020** 0.036** 
 2.17 2.50 2.19 2.46 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -4.51 -3.84 -4.59 -3.81 
DecShrOffer -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
 -3.70 -3.07 -3.58 -3.03 
Sales -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005** 
 -2.24 -2.57 -2.13 -2.46 
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Year 0.002*** -0.001 0.002*** -0.002 
 2.87 -1.06 2.91 -1.60 
Constant -4.398*** 2.378 -4.447*** 3.596 
 -2.82 1.08 -2.87 1.61 
Number of Obs 5198 3476 5198 3476 












































Table 6. IPO Characteristics and the Impact of Investor Sentiment on 
Underpricing: Subsample Analysis  
 
This table summarizes the subsample analysis. Panel A is for hitech and non-hitech 
subsamples, based on whether the IPO firms is in hitech industry or not. Panel B is for 
subsamples based on firm age, which is the number of years between the founding year 
and the IPO year. Panel C is for subsamples based on institutional holding fraction, which 
is the number of shares held by institutional investors as reported in 13-F file at the end 
of the IPO quarter divided by CRSP shares outstanding on the IPO date. Panel D is for 
subsamples based on firm size, which is the IPO firm’s sales in the prior fiscal year 
before IPO from Compustat. Panel E is for subsamples based on research and 
development expenses (R&D) from Compustat. Panel F is for subsamples based on 
profitability, which is the IPO firm’s EBITDA divided by sales in the prior fiscal year 
before IPO from Compustat. Column [1] is for IPO firms with characteristics more prone 
to sentiment. Column [2] is for IPO firms with characteristics less prone to sentiment. 
Column [3] is for their differences. The dependent variable is underpricing, which is the 
percentage change in the price between the offer price and the first-day closing price. 
ICSR is the market wide sentiment measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment 
constructed by University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on 
macroeconomic variables. ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of small investors for 
IPO on the first trading date after the IPO date. Revision is the percentage change from 
the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. Revision+ equals to one if the Revision 
is positive, zero otherwise. MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead managers’ ranks. 
MaxRank_BF1990 equals to MaxRank if the IPO is issued before 1990, zero otherwise. 
HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero otherwise. Venture 
equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. Nasdaq 
equals to one if the IPO is listed on Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age is the number of years 
between the founding year and the IPO year. DecShrOffer takes the values from 1 to 10, 
by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for the IPOs in the same year. ShrOffer is the number of 
shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the prior fiscal year before 
offering from Compustat, in billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, ** and *** represents 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.  
 
Panel A1: HiTech 
 [1] HiTech [2] Non-HiTech [3] Difference 
 Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.010*** 9.53 0.003*** 4.86 0.007*** 5.85 
Revision 0.225*** 2.72 0.292*** 3.71 -0.067 -0.70 
Revision+ 1.330*** 8.00 0.628* 1.91 0.648* 1.95 
MaxRank 0.011** 2.07 -0.001 -0.16 0.012*** 2.78 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.012*** -3.71 -0.008*** -4.36 -0.004*** -4.69 
Venture 0.028 1.33 0.025*** 2.64 0.003 0.11 
Nasdaq -0.001 -0.06 0.032*** 3.78 -0.033* -1.65 
Age -0.002*** -3.11 -0.001*** -4.28 -0.001** -2.00 
DecShrOffer -0.015*** -3.35 -0.002 -0.82 -0.013*** -2.90 
Sales -0.002 -0.48 -0.004** -2.03 0.002 0.79 
Year 0.005*** 3.23 0.001 1.58 0.004 0.44 
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Constant -10.625*** -3.20 -2.166 -1.51   
Number of Obs 2060   3138       
R-Square 0.428   0.300       
Panel A2: HiTech 
 [1] HiTech [2] Non-HiTech [3] Difference 
 Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.009*** 5.78 0.003*** 3.47 0.006*** 3.21 
ANetBuy 0.004*** 7.38 0.001** 2.48 0.003*** 4.94 
Revision 0.350*** 3.39 0.338*** 3.14 0.012 0.12 
Revision+ 1.223*** 6.65 0.686 1.61 0.537 1.15 
MaxRank 0.026*** 3.41 0.005 1.16 0.021** 2.22 
Venture 0.030 1.08 0.030** 2.17 0.000 0.00 
Nasdaq 0.015 0.46 0.048*** 3.59 -0.033 -0.89 
Age -0.002** -2.47 -0.001*** -3.09 -0.001 -1.57 
DecShrOffer -0.018*** -3.14 -0.002 -0.44 -0.016** -2.38 
Sales -0.003 -0.97 -0.005** -2.37 0.002 0.42 
Year -0.003 -1.15 0.000 0.23 -0.003 0.54 
Constant 5.527 1.16 -0.425 -0.20   
Number of Obs 1527   1949       
R-Square 0.437   0.332       
 
Panel B1: Firm Age 
 [1] Young [2] Old [3] Difference  
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.009*** 8.88 0.003*** 5.19 0.006*** 4.48 
Revision 0.227*** 3.64 0.331*** 3.31 -0.104 -0.86 
Revision+ 1.260*** 8.05 0.518 1.37 0.742* 1.80 
MaxRank 0.010** 2.40 0.001 0.28 0.099 1.51 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.017*** -5.37 -0.007*** -3.45 -0.010*** -3.67 
HiTech 0.075*** 4.43 0.055*** 4.60 0.020 0.96 
Venture 0.024 1.42 0.026** 2.26 -0.002 -0.11 
Nasdaq 0.020 1.45 0.020* 1.95 0.000 0.03 
Age -0.012*** -3.88 -0.000*** -2.83 -0.012*** -3.74 
DecShrOffer -0.015*** -4.13 -0.002 -0.69 -0.013*** -3.08 
Sales -0.028** -1.98 -0.003** -2.08 -0.025* -1.81 
Year 0.002 1.30 0.003*** 3.44 -0.001* 1.75 
Constant -3.560 -1.25 -5.207*** -3.38   
Number of Obs 2779   2419       
R-Square 0.436   0.316       
Panel B2: Firm Age 
 [1] Young [2] Old [3] Difference  
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  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.008*** 5.70 0.004*** 4.32 0.004 1.62 
ANetBuy 0.003*** 7.56 0.000 1.12 0.003*** 5.82 
Revision 0.306*** 4.04 0.420*** 3.42 -0.114 -0.72 
Revision+ 1.260*** 8.16 0.419 0.96 0.841* 1.79 
MaxRank 0.024*** 4.19 0.004 0.82 0.020** 2.11 
HiTech 0.083*** 3.74 0.069*** 4.25 0.014 0.51 
Venture 0.019 0.82 0.037** 2.14 -0.018 -0.64 
Nasdaq 0.031 1.46 0.032* 1.95 -0.001 0.12 
Age -0.014*** -3.47 -0.001** -2.35 -0.013*** -3.47 
DecShrOffer -0.018*** -3.58 0.000 -0.12 -0.018** -2.49 
Sales -0.036** -2.12 -0.003** -2.15 -0.033** -2.00 
Year -0.004** -2.05 0.002* 1.94 -0.006 0.66 
Constant 7.901** 2.07 -4.296* -1.91   
Number of Obs 1906   1570       
R-Square 0.469   0.310       
 
Panel C1: Institutional Holding Fraction 
 [1] Low IO [2] High IO [3] Difference  
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.007*** 7.05 0.005*** 6.25 0.002 1.39 
Revision 0.365*** 3.30 0.096 1.26 0.269** 2.01 
Revision+ 0.689** 2.00 1.486*** 5.88 -0.797* -1.87 
MaxRank 0.015** 2.49 0.005 1.13 0.010 1.07 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.019*** -4.91 -0.008*** -2.81 -0.011*** -2.58 
HiTech 0.074*** 3.54 0.056*** 3.70 0.018 0.68 
Venture 0.023 1.12 0.032** 2.33 -0.009 -0.33 
Nasdaq 0.031** 2.18 0.012 0.90 0.019 1.06 
Age -0.001*** -3.27 -0.000** -2.31 -0.001** -1.96 
DecShrOffer -0.006 -1.49 -0.007** -2.22 0.001 0.28 
Sales -0.008** -2.10 -0.002 -1.33 -0.006 -1.43 
Year 0.000 0.20 0.002** 1.97 -0.002 0.63 
Constant -0.516 -0.18 -4.351* -1.96   
Number of Obs 2049   2048       
R-Square 0.314   0.505       
Panel C2: Institutional Holding Fraction 
 [1] Low IO [2] High IO [3] Difference  
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.008*** 4.26 0.004*** 5.19 0.004 1.49 
ANetBuy 0.003*** 5.52 0.001*** 3.48 0.002*** 2.64 
Revision 0.512*** 3.36 0.088 1.39 0.424*** 2.59 
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Revision+ 0.538 1.36 1.694*** 9.34 -1.156*** -2.66 
MaxRank 0.026*** 3.13 0.011* 1.78 0.015 1.25 
HiTech 0.091*** 2.93 0.049*** 3.15 0.042 1.21 
Venture 0.035 1.08 0.023 1.42 0.012 0.33 
Nasdaq 0.062** 2.39 0.029 1.52 0.033 1.10 
Age -0.001** -2.31 -0.000** -2.23 -0.001 -1.56 
DecShrOffer -0.009 -1.30 -0.006 -1.60 -0.003 -0.24 
Sales -0.010*** -2.76 -0.004* -1.65 -0.006 -1.56 
Year -0.003 -1.57 0.000 -0.15 -0.003 0.10 
Constant 5.981 1.57 0.397 0.14   
Number of Obs 1246   1561       
R-Square 0.330   0.546       
 
Panel D1: Firm Size Based on Sales 
 [1] Small [2] Large [3] Difference  
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.008*** 8.23 0.004*** 6.21 0.004*** 3.14 
Revision 0.391*** 4.07 0.124*** 2.77 0.267** 2.53 
Revision+ 0.914*** 3.19 1.195*** 8.18 -0.281 -0.88 
MaxRank 0.018*** 3.52 -0.001 -0.42 0.019*** 3.20 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.017*** -4.65 -0.005*** -3.50 -0.012*** -3.69 
HiTech 0.081*** 4.29 0.043*** 4.02 0.038* 1.75 
Venture -0.002 -0.09 0.025** 2.43 -0.027 -1.18 
Nasdaq 0.011 0.67 0.023*** 2.74 -0.012 -0.61 
Age -0.002*** -2.77 0.000 -1.46 -0.002** -2.50 
DecShrOffer -0.011*** -2.62 -0.002 -0.92 -0.009* -1.88 
Sales -4.029*** -3.83 -0.003** -2.15 -4.026*** -3.82 
Year 0.002 1.50 0.003*** 3.92 -0.001* 1.84 
Constant -4.449 -1.46 -6.070*** -3.90   
Number of Obs 2599   2599       
R-Square 0.395   0.441       
Panel D2: Firm Size Based on Sales 
 [1] Small [2] Large [3] Difference  
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.006*** 3.72 0.005*** 5.55 0.001 0.50 
ANetBuy 0.003*** 5.68 0.001*** 2.96 0.002*** 4.06 
Revision 0.488*** 4.05 0.184*** 3.15 0.304** 2.28 
Revision+ 0.868*** 2.66 1.213*** 7.12 -0.345 -0.94 
MaxRank 0.032*** 4.61 0.003 0.66 0.029*** 3.41 
HiTech 0.107*** 3.87 0.045*** 3.41 0.062** 2.01 
Venture -0.014 -0.48 0.037** 2.53 -0.051 -1.56 
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Nasdaq 0.028 0.90 0.041*** 3.18 -0.013 -0.40 
Age -0.002** -2.08 0.000 -1.42 -0.002* -1.85 
DecShrOffer -0.017*** -2.84 -0.001 -0.37 -0.016** -2.41 
Sales -4.040*** -2.78 -0.004** -2.31 -4.036*** -2.78 
Year 0.000 0.20 0.001 0.45 -0.001 0.77 
Constant -0.928 -0.19 -0.979 -0.45   
Number of Obs 1710   1766       
R-Square 0.419   0.456       
 
Panel E1: R&D 
 [1] High R&D [2] Low R&D [3] Difference  
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.009*** 10.10 0.003*** 4.70 0.006*** 5.97 
Revision 0.306*** 3.19 0.237*** 4.61 0.069 0.58 
Revision+ 1.098*** 3.88 0.769*** 4.35 0.329 1.01 
MaxRank 0.010* 1.78 0.000 -0.10 0.010** 2.29 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.015*** -4.51 -0.008*** -3.87 -0.007*** -4.50 
HiTech 0.071*** 3.77 0.046*** 3.56 0.025 1.13 
Venture 0.027 1.45 0.014 1.43 0.013 0.56 
Nasdaq 0.014 0.72 0.025*** 3.58 -0.011 -0.67 
Age -0.001*** -3.03 -0.001*** -4.69 0.000 -1.29 
DecShrOffer -0.006 -1.52 -0.005** -2.29 -0.001 -0.50 
Sales -0.006** -2.51 -0.002 -0.93 -0.004 -1.42 
Year 0.004*** 3.36 0.001 1.08 0.003* -1.85 
Constant -8.477*** -3.35 -1.727 -1.01   
Number of Obs 2599   2599       
R-Square 0.415   0.334       
Panel E2: R&D 
 [1] High R&D [2] Low R&D [3] Difference  
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.008*** 6.35 0.003*** 3.10 0.005*** 3.43 
ANetBuy 0.004*** 7.99 0.000 1.49 0.004*** 7.22 
Revision 0.426*** 3.92 0.220*** 3.83 0.206* 1.68 
Revision+ 0.985*** 3.25 0.978*** 6.99 0.007 0.02 
MaxRank 0.026*** 3.39 0.005 1.14 0.021** 2.43 
HiTech 0.086*** 3.40 0.055*** 3.29 0.031 1.04 
Venture 0.030 1.17 0.015 1.05 0.015 0.54 
Nasdaq 0.044 1.43 0.025** 2.29 0.019 0.63 
Age -0.002*** -3.15 -0.000*** -2.78 -0.002** -2.17 
DecShrOffer -0.008 -1.41 -0.009*** -2.62 0.001 0.19 
Sales -0.008*** -2.79 -0.002 -1.21 -0.006* -1.71 
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Year -0.002 -1.08 0.000 -0.04 -0.002** -2.13 
Constant 3.926 1.07 0.193 0.08   
Number of Obs 1883   1593       
R-Square 0.440   0.381       
 
Panel F1: Profitability 
 [1] Low Prof. [2] High Prof. [3] Difference  
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.008*** 7.77 0.003*** 3.93 0.005*** 4.14 
Revision 0.330*** 3.05 0.284*** 5.53 0.046 0.41 
Revision+ 1.098*** 3.47 0.626*** 3.22 0.472 1.26 
MaxRank 0.015*** 2.60 -0.003 -1.06 0.018*** 2.72 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.020*** -6.15 -0.006*** -2.85 -0.014*** -4.10 
HiTech 0.083*** 3.89 0.038*** 3.91 0.045* 1.87 
Venture 0.024 1.21 0.005 0.52 0.019 0.89 
Nasdaq 0.007 0.40 0.027*** 3.48 -0.020 -0.97 
Age -0.001*** -3.60 -0.000*** -3.38 -0.001** -2.32 
DecShrOffer -0.012*** -2.97 -0.003 -1.46 -0.009* -1.82 
Sales -0.012 -1.46 -0.001 -0.84 -0.011 -1.43 
Year 0.000 0.07 0.002** 2.18 -0.002 -1.32 
Constant -0.092 -0.04 -3.997** -2.12   
Number of Obs 2357   2356       
R-Square 0.435   0.298       
Panel F2: Profitability 
 [1] Low Prof. [2] High Prof. [3] Difference  
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Diff. t-stat 
ICSR 0.006*** 4.42 0.004*** 3.77 0.002 1.21 
ANetBuy 0.003*** 6.48 0.000 0.75 0.003*** 5.37 
Revision 0.427*** 3.31 0.276*** 6.07 0.151 1.16 
Revision+ 1.008*** 2.93 0.794*** 5.20 0.214 0.54 
MaxRank 0.028*** 3.91 0.001 0.23 0.027*** 2.76 
HiTech 0.083*** 3.17 0.050*** 3.90 0.033 1.08 
Venture 0.023 0.89 0.002 0.14 0.021 0.68 
Nasdaq 0.017 0.60 0.042*** 3.16 -0.025 -0.63 
Age -0.001*** -2.93 -0.000** -2.32 -0.001** -2.34 
DecShrOffer -0.014*** -2.69 -0.004 -1.21 -0.010 -1.15 
Sales -0.018 -1.49 -0.002 -1.14 -0.016 -1.56 
Year -0.005*** -2.88 0.002* 1.72 0.007 -1.13 
Constant 10.757*** 2.89 -4.398* -1.68   
Number of Obs 1745   1388       
R-Square 0.451   0.320       
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Table 7. Volatility of IPO Underpricing and Investor Sentiment 
 
This table presents the result by regressing monthly volatility of IPO underpricing on 
monthly sentiment measures and mean control variables. Column [1] and [2] include all 
observations. Column [3] and [4] use the number of IPOs within one month as the weight 
in the regression (aweight option in STATA). Column [5] and [6] drop months with 
fewer than 2 IPOs. The dependent variable is volatility, which is the standard deviation of 
the underprcing for all the IPOs in each month. ICSR is the market wide sentiment 
measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed by University of Michigan 
Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. Mean ANetBuy is 
the mean of the abnormal order flow of small investors on the first trading date after the 
IPO date for all IPOs within one month. Predicted Mean ANetBuy is the predicted value 
by regressing mean ANetBuy on ICSR. Residual Mean ANetBuy is the residual by 
regressing mean ANetBuy on ICSR. Mean Revision is the mean of the percentage change 
from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. Mean Revision+ equals to Mean 
Revision if the Mean Revision is positive, zero otherwise. Mean MaxRank is mean of 
MaxRank of all IPOs within one month. MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead 
managers' ranks. Mean HiTech is the fraction of HiTech IPOs in all IPOs within one 
month. Mean Venture is the fraction of IPOs backed by venture capitalists in all IPOs 
within one month. Mean Nasdaq is the fraction of IPOs listed on Nasdaq within one 
month. Mean Age is the mean of the number of years between the founding year and the 
IPO year of all IPOs within one month. Mean DecShrOffer is the mean of the shares 
offered in the IPOs ranked into deciles for all IPOs within one month, in millions. Mean 
Sales is the mean of sales for the prior fiscal year from Compustat for all IPOs within one 
month. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. t-
statistics are included below the coefficients. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
   Aweight Drop 
ICSR 0.003**  0.004***  0.003***  
 2.19  4.10  2.95  
Predicted Mean 
ANetBuy  0.009**  0.007*  0.009*** 
  2.56  1.98  2.64 
Residual Mean 
ANetBuy  0.008**  0.007***  0.007** 
  2.19  3.66  2.06 
Mean Revision -0.334* -0.182 -0.507*** -0.174 
-
0.578*** -0.325 
 -1.87 -0.55 -3.03 -0.56 -3.30 -0.93 
Mean Revision+ 2.357*** 1.889*** 2.417*** 1.676*** 2.767*** 2.062*** 
 7.08 2.96 8.78 3.42 8.75 3.08 
Mean MaxRank 0.000 -0.062 0.020 -0.017 -0.001 -0.061 
 0.01 -1.05 1.52 -0.55 -0.08 -1.03 
Mean HiTech 0.229*** 0.418*** 0.361*** 0.445*** 0.267*** 0.427*** 
 2.79 2.89 4.91 4.18 2.98 2.97 
Mean Venture 0.020 0.159 0.044 0.174 0.017 0.179 
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 0.37 1.15 0.64 1.53 0.31 1.31 
Mean Nasdaq 0.057 -0.039 0.069 0.152 0.030 -0.039 
 1.08 -0.29 1.31 1.36 0.53 -0.29 
Mean Age -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 -1.35 -1.12 -0.96 -0.51 -1.17 -1.01 
Mean 
DecShrOffer -0.015 -0.006 -0.011 0.007 -0.013 -0.007 
 -1.45 -0.41 -1.02 0.46 -1.26 -0.45 
Mean Sales 0.105 0.058 0.065 0.041 0.093 0.059 
 1.45 0.80 1.25 0.84 1.25 0.80 
Constant 0.020 0.503 -0.214** -0.080 -0.002 0.470 
 0.17 1.05 -2.00 -0.32 -0.02 0.96 
Number of Obs 300 159 300 159 285 158 


































Table 8. Investor Sentiment and IPO Long-Run Returns  
 
This table summarizes the results of examining the relationship between investor 
sentiment and IPO long-run returns. Long-run returns are defined as the buy-and-hold 
return of the IPO firms measured from the end of the first aftermarket trading day until 2, 
3, 6, or 12 months later less the buy-and-hold return on CRSP value-weighted portfolio, 
following Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006). ICSR is the market wide sentiment 
measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed by University of Michigan 
Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. MaxRank is the 
maximum of all the lead managers’ ranks. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is 
backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of 
small investors for IPO on the first trading date after the IPO date. *, ** and *** 
represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.  
   [1] 2 months [2] 3 months [3] 6 months [4]12 months 
Panel A:     
ICSR -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002* -0.003** 
 -2.94 -2.64 -1.88 -1.97 
Constant 0.025*** 0.042*** 0.025*** -0.028** 
 5.58 6.8 2.75 -2.36 
Number of Obs 5197 5197 5197 5197 
Adjusted R-Square 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Panel B:     
ICSR -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002* -0.003* 
 -2.89 -2.6 -1.86 -1.96 
MaxRank 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 
 6.03 5.74 3.66 3.71 
Venture 0.027*** 0.029** 0.008 -0.001 
 2.91 2.22 0.4 -0.06 
Constant -0.066*** -0.082*** -0.088*** -0.189*** 
 -4.83 -4.06 -2.74 -4.13 
Number of Obs 5197 5197 5197 5197 
Adjusted R-Square 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.004 
Panel C:     
ICSR -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004** -0.005** 
 -2.87 -2.81 -2.2 -1.99 
ANetBuy -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 -2.3 -0.50 -0.10 -1.31 
MaxRank 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.036*** 
 6.49 5.64 4.38 5.16 
Venture 0.042*** 0.043** 0.026 0.005 
 3.37 2.43 1.04 0.15 
Constant -0.097*** -0.114*** -0.155*** -0.299*** 
 -5.37 -3.97 -3.66 -5.69 
Number of Obs 3476 3476 3476 3476 
Adjusted R-Square 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.007 
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Table 9. Monthly Regression 
 
This table presents the result for the monthly regression, by regressing monthly mean 
underpricing on monthly sentiment measures and mean control variables. Column [1] and 
[2] include all observations. Column [3] and [4] use the number of IPOs within one 
month as the weight in the regression (aweight option in STATA). Column [5] and [6] 
drop months with fewer than 2 IPOs. The dependent variable is volatility, which is the 
standard deviation of the underprcing for all the IPOs in each month. ICSR is the market 
wide sentiment measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed by 
University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on macroeconomic 
variables. Mean ANetBuy is the mean of the abnormal order flow of small investors on 
the first trading date after the IPO date for all IPOs within one month. Predicted Mean 
ANetBuy is the predicted value by regressing mean ANetBuy on ICSR. Residual Mean 
ANetBuy is the residual by regressing mean ANetBuy on ICSR. Mean Revision is the 
mean of the percentage change from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. 
Mean Revision+ equals to Mean Revision if the Mean Revision is positive, zero otherwise. 
Mean MaxRank is mean of MaxRank of all IPOs within one month. MaxRank is the 
maximum of all the lead managers' ranks. Mean HiTech is the fraction of HiTech IPOs in 
all IPOs within one month. Mean Venture is the fraction of IPOs backed by venture 
capitalists in all IPOs within one month. Mean Nasdaq is the fraction of IPOs listed on 
Nasdaq within one month. Mean Age is the mean of the number of years between the 
founding year and the IPO year of all IPOs within one month. Mean DecShrOffer is the 
mean of the shares offered in the IPOs ranked into deciles for all IPOs within one month, 
in millions. Mean Sales is the mean of sales for the prior fiscal year from Compustat for 
all IPOs within one month. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
level respectively. t-statistics are included below the coefficients. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
   Aweight Drop 
ICSR 0.002**  0.003***  0.003***  
 2.47  4.85  3.84  
Predicted Mean 
ANetBuy  0.008**  0.004*  0.006*** 
  2.10  1.70  2.67 
Residual Mean 
ANetBuy  0.008***  0.005***  0.006** 
  3.40  3.97  2.40 
Mean Revision -0.203 0.004 -0.342*** -0.084 -0.345** -0.186 
 -1.55 0.02 -2.93 -0.39 -2.58 -0.72 
Mean Revision+ 2.350*** 1.876*** 2.491*** 1.981*** 2.561*** 2.154*** 
 7.49 3.84 10.45 5.22 9.17 4.27 
Mean MaxRank -0.013 -0.054* -0.001 -0.026 -0.010 -0.056 
 -1.42 -1.66 -0.09 -1.25 -1.03 -1.41 
Mean HiTech 0.000 -0.010 0.186*** 0.184** 0.177*** 0.225** 
 0.00 -0.05 3.77 2.53 2.93 2.35 
Mean Venture 0.088 0.191* 0.067 0.172** 0.063 0.212** 
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 1.59 1.74 1.38 2.33 1.41 2.34 
Mean Nasdaq 0.108*** 0.250*** 0.076** 0.203*** 0.043 0.042 
 2.99 2.86 2.04 2.65 1.03 0.43 
Mean Age -0.003** -0.003 -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 -2.35 -1.65 -1.78 -1.23 -1.35 -1.30 
Mean 
DecShrOffer -0.006 0.031 -0.003 0.018 -0.011 0.005 
 -0.60 1.33 -0.44 1.60 -1.47 0.44 
Mean Sales 0.087** 0.054 0.065* 0.055 0.081 0.064 
 2.03 1.15 1.74 1.63 1.63 1.31 
Constant 0.050 0.119 -0.112* -0.107 0.016 0.282 
 0.79 0.60 -1.71 -0.68 0.20 0.86 
Number of Obs 324 170 324 170 285 158 

































Table 10. Cluster Analysis 
 
This table presents the result of cluster analysis by month. The dependent variable is 
underpricing, which is the percentage change in the price between the offer price and the 
first-day closing price. ICSR is the market wide sentiment measure from the Index of 
Consumer Sentiment constructed by University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, 
orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of 
small investors for IPO on the first trading date after the IPO date. Revision is the 
percentage change from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. Revision+ 
equals to one if the Revision is positive, zero otherwise. MaxRank is the maximum of all 
the lead managers’ ranks. MaxRank_BF1990 equals to MaxRank if the IPO is issued 
before 1990, zero otherwise. HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, 
zero otherwise. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, 
zero otherwise. Nasdaq equals to one if the IPO is listed on Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age 
is the number of years between the founding year and the IPO year. DecShrOffer takes 
the values from 1 to 10, by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for the IPOs in the same year. 
ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the 
prior fiscal year before offering from Compustat, in billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, 
** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
 
 [1] [2] 
  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
ICSR 0.007*** 6.98 0.006*** 5.04 
ANetBuy   0.002*** 4.07 
Revision 0.248*** 3.65 0.332*** 3.88 
Revision+ 1.089*** 5.06 1.062*** 4.42 
MaxRank 0.006 1.64 0.016*** 3.12 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.012*** -4.39 0 . 
HiTech 0.066*** 4.82 0.076*** 4.09 
Venture 0.028** 2.28 0.033* 1.92 
Nasdaq 0.020** 2.19 0.037** 2.54 
Age -0.001*** -3.87 -0.001*** -3.34 
DecShrOffer -0.008*** -3.60 -0.010*** -3.05 
Sales -0.004** -2.24 -0.005*** -2.63 
Year 0.002* 1.88 -0.001 -0.65 
Constant -4.398* -1.84 2.378 0.66 
Number of Obs 5198  3476  








Table 11. Controlling for Future Corporate Profits and Consumer Spending  
 
This table presents the result of testing the relationship between IPO underpricing and 
investor sentiment, based on alternative approaches of ICS decomposition. The 
dependent variable is underpricing, which is the percentage change in the price between 
the offer price and the first-day closing price. ICSR is the market wide sentiment measure 
from the Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed by University of Michigan Survey 
Research Centre, orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. ICS_R and ICS_P are the 
residual and the predicted value accordingly from regressing ICS on future corporate 
profits and consumer spending from Bureau of Economic Analysis, following Qiu and 
Welch (2004). ICSR is the residual from regressing ICS on macro variables as those in 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006). ICSR_R and ICSR_P are the residual and the 
predicted value accordingly from regressing ICSR on future corporate profits and 
consumer spending following Qiu and Welch (2004). ANetBuy is the abnormal order 
flow of small investors for IPO on the first trading date after the IPO date. Revision is the 
percentage change from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. Revision+ 
equals to one if the Revision is positive, zero otherwise. MaxRank is the maximum of all 
the lead managers’ ranks. MaxRank_BF1990 equals to MaxRank if the IPO is issued 
before 1990, zero otherwise. HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, 
zero otherwise. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, 
zero otherwise. Nasdaq equals to one if the IPO is listed on Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age 
is the number of years between the founding year and the IPO year. DecShrOffer takes 
the values from 1 to 10, by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for the IPOs in the same year. 
ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the 
prior fiscal year before offering from Compustat, in billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, 
** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. t-statistics are 
included below the coefficients. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
ICS_R 0.006***    
 9.20    
ICS_P  0.025***   
  10.62   
ICSR_R   0.005***  
   5.32  
ICSR_P    0.042*** 
    10.67 
ANetBuy 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 7.07 6.76 7.42 6.75 
Revision 0.335*** 0.329*** 0.333*** 0.329*** 
 4.13 4.07 4.09 4.07 
Revision+ 1.049*** 1.050*** 1.072*** 1.048*** 
 4.41 4.43 4.48 4.42 
MaxRank 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 
 3.60 2.73 3.41 2.78 
HiTech 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.079*** 0.069*** 
 4.42 4.31 4.79 4.29 
Venture 0.040** 0.025* 0.034** 0.026* 
 2.58 1.67 2.24 1.72 
Nasdaq 0.035** 0.037** 0.037** 0.037** 
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 2.38 2.54 2.56 2.57 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -3.49 -3.12 -3.96 -3.11 
DecShrOffer -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 -3.56 -2.82 -3.04 -2.85 
Sales -0.004** -0.007*** -0.005** -0.007** 
 -2.25 -2.58 -2.52 -2.57 
Year -0.003** 0.004*** -0.003** 0.015*** 
 -2.38 3.42 -2.25 8.19 
Constant 5.327** -10.234*** 5.280** -30.370*** 
 2.37 -4.15 2.27 -8.18 
Number of Obs 3476 3476 3476 3476 





































Table 12. Reduced BW Index  
 
This table summarizes the result of using alternative sentiment measure ---- the reduced 
Baker and Wurgler sentiment index. The dependent variable is underpricing, which is the 
percentage change in the price between the offer price and the first-day closing price. 
BWrd is the reduced Baker and Wurgler Index, based on the dividend premium, closed-
end fund discount and NYSE turnover. These three proxies are first orthogonalized on 
macroeconomic variables and then the first principal component of the three residuals is 
constructed as the reduced BW index. ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of small 
investors for IPO on the first trading date after the IPO date. Revision is the percentage 
change from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. Revision+ equals to one if 
the Revision is positive, zero otherwise. MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead 
managers’ ranks. MaxRank_BF1990 equals to MaxRank if the IPO is issued before 1990, 
zero otherwise. HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero 
otherwise. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, zero 
otherwise. Nasdaq equals to one if the IPO is listed on Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age is the 
number of years between the founding year and the IPO year. DecShrOffer takes the 
values from 1 to 10, by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for the IPOs in the same year. 
ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the 
prior fiscal year before offering from Compustat, in billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, 
** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.  
 
 [1] [2] 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
BWrd 0.023*** 3.33 0.011 0.80 
ANetBuy   0.002*** 7.83 
Revision 0.256*** 3.95 0.334*** 4.10 
Revision+ 1.106*** 5.31 1.086*** 4.54 
MaxRank 0.004 1.12 0.016*** 3.44 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.005** -2.55   
HiTech 0.073*** 6.01 0.082*** 4.98 
Venture 0.025** 2.37 0.034** 2.23 
Nasdaq 0.024** 2.57 0.040*** 2.70 
Age -0.001*** -4.90 -0.001*** -3.93 
DecShrOffer -0.008*** -3.39 -0.010*** -2.91 
Sales -0.000** -2.02 -0.005** -2.56 
Year 0.004*** 5.06 0.000 0.23 
Constant -7.940*** -5.03 -0.516 -0.22 
Number of Obs 5195  3476  









Table 13. AAII Sentiment Measure 
 
This table summarizes the result of using alternative sentiment measure ---- the bull-bear 
spread of the survey conducted by American Association of Individual Investors, used as 
investor sentiment measure in Brown and Cliff (2004, 2005). The dependent variable is 
underpricing, which is the percentage change in the price between the offer price and the 
first-day closing price. AAIIR is the residual from regressing AAII on macro variables as 
those in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006). AAIIR_R and AAIIR_P are the residual and 
the predicted value accordingly from regressing AAIIR on future corporate profits and 
consumer spending from Bureau of Economic Analysis, following Qiu and Welch (2004). 
ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of small investors for IPO on the first trading date 
after the IPO date. Revision is the percentage change from the midpoint of the filing 
range to the offer price. Revision+ equals to one if the Revision is positive, zero otherwise. 
MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead managers’ ranks. MaxRank_BF1990 equals to 
MaxRank if the IPO is issued before 1990, zero otherwise. HiTech equals to one if the 
IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero otherwise. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is 
backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. Nasdaq equals to one if the IPO is listed on 
Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age is the number of years between the founding year and the 
IPO year. DecShrOffer takes the values from 1 to 10, by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for 
the IPOs in the same year. ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the IPO, in 
millions. Sales is the sales for the prior fiscal year before offering from Compustat, in 
billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. t-statistics are included below the coefficients. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
AAII 0.186***    
 4.44    
AAIIR  0.081*   
  1.89   
AAIIR_R   0.056  
   1.31  
AAIIR_P    7.846*** 
    10.87 
ANetBuy 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 7.75 7.85 7.85 6.73 
Revision 0.312*** 0.324*** 0.327*** 0.328*** 
 3.89 4.01 4.04 4.05 
Revision+ 1.094*** 1.092*** 1.090*** 1.047*** 
 4.62 4.58 4.57 4.41 
MaxRank 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 3.5 3.47 3.47 2.79 
HiTech 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.067*** 
 4.95 5.01 5.00 4.2 
Venture 0.033** 0.033** 0.034** 0.029* 
 2.16 2.17 2.19 1.9 
Nasdaq 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.037** 
 2.58 2.65 2.66 2.54 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -3.77 -3.92 -3.94 -3.14 
DecShrOffer -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
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 -3.02 -2.94 -2.93 -2.94 
Sales -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007** 
 -2.65 -2.60 -2.58 -2.54 
Year -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.027*** 
 -0.74 0.20 0.07 9.73 
Constant 1.745 -0.441 -0.151 -54.330*** 
 0.74 -0.19 -0.06 -9.72 
Number of Obs 3476 3476 3476 3476 









































Table 14. Alternative Definition of Abnormal Order Flow 
 
This table summarizes the result of using alternative definition of abnormal order flow. 
Column [1] uses matching-firm approach, in which ANetBuy_Match equals to the netbuy 
of IPOs by small investors on the first trading date in TAQ minus the netbuy of matching 
firm by small investors on the same date. The matching firms are found following 
Purnanadan and Swaminathan (2004), as those in Table 3. In column [2], netbuy is 
standardized to represent the firm-specific investor sentiment on the IPO firms. 
NetBuy_Standardize equals to the netbuy of the IPO firm deflated by the sum of buy 
and sell orders of the IPO firm. The dependent variable is underpricing, which is the 
percentage change in the price between the offer price and the first-day closing price. 
ICSR is the market wide sentiment measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment 
constructed by University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on 
macroeconomic variables. Revision+ equals to one if the Revision is positive, zero 
otherwise. MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead managers’ ranks. MaxRank_BF1990 
equals to MaxRank if the IPO is issued before 1990, zero otherwise. HiTech equals to 
one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero otherwise. Venture equals to one if the 
IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. Nasdaq equals to one if the IPO 
is listed on Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age is the number of years between the founding 
year and the IPO year. DecShrOffer takes the values from 1 to 10, by ranking ShrOffer 
into deciles for the IPOs in the same year. ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the 
IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the prior fiscal year before offering from 
Compustat, in billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level respectively. t-statistics are included below the coefficients. 
 
 [1] Matching-Firm Approach [2] NetBuy Standardization 
ICSR 0.003*** 0.007*** 
 3.07 8.22 
ANetBuy_Match 0.0001***  
 2.91  
NetBuy_Standardize  0.123*** 
  9.66 
Revision 0.253*** 0.319*** 
 5.00 3.90 
Revision+ 0.923*** 1.077*** 
 4.91 4.49 
MaxRank -0.0003 0.017*** 
 -0.05 3.64 
HiTech 0.062*** 0.072*** 
 3.90 4.42 
Venture 0.014 0.032** 
 0.80 2.08 
NASDAQ 0.030* 0.040*** 
 1.93 2.72 
Age -0.0003 -0.0008*** 
 -1.58 -3.67 
Decshroffer -0.005 -0.011*** 
 -1.26 -3.25 
80 
 
Sales -0.004* -0.005** 
 -1.86 -2.38 
Year 0.002 -0.0001 
 1.40 -0.08 
Constant -3.838 0.180 
 -1.36 0.08 
Number of Obs 1055 3474 









































Table 15. Bubble Period 
 
This table presents the result of the impact of investor sentiment on underpricing in 
bubble period. The dependent variable is underpricing, which is the percentage change in 
the price between the offer price and the first-day closing price. ICSR is the market wide 
sentiment measure from the Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed by University of 
Michigan Survey Research Centre, orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. 
ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of small investors for IPO on the first trading date 
after the IPO date. Bubble equals to one if the IPO occurs between September 1998 and 
August 2000, zero otherwise. ICSR*Bubble is the product of ICSR and Bubble. 
ANetBuy*Bubble is the product of ANetBuy and Bubble. Revision is the percentage 
change from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. Revision+ equals to one if 
the Revision is positive, zero otherwise. MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead 
managers’ ranks. MaxRank_BF1990 equals to MaxRank if the IPO is issued before 1990, 
zero otherwise. HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero 
otherwise. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, zero 
otherwise. Nasdaq equals to one if the IPO is listed on Nasdaq, zero otherwise. Age is the 
number of years between the founding year and the IPO year. DecShrOffer takes the 
values from 1 to 10, by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for the IPOs in the same year. 
ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the 
prior fiscal year before offering from Compustat, in billion. Year is the IPO issue year. *, 
** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
 
 [1] [2] 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
ICSR 0.002*** 3.78 0.001* 1.74 
ICSR*Bubble 0.028*** 8.90 0.020*** 6.33 
ANetBuy   0.000*** 2.83 
ANetBuy*Bubble   0.011*** 8.63 
Revision 0.256*** 4.04 0.277*** 3.61 
Revision+ 1.009*** 4.94 1.026*** 4.44 
MaxRank 0.000 0.17 0.013*** 2.82 
HiTech 0.054*** 4.68 0.058*** 3.77 
Venture 0.021** 2.02 0.017 1.22 
Nasdaq 0.016* 1.77 0.016 1.16 
Age -0.001*** -3.79 -0.001*** -2.90 
DecShrOffer -0.007*** -3.25 -0.011*** -3.39 
Sales -0.004** -2.08 -0.007** -2.06 
Year 0.003*** 6.16 0.000 -0.29 
Constant -6.046*** -6.07 0.618 0.31 
Number of Obs 5198  3476  







Table 16. Influential Observations 
 
This table presents the results after dropping 4 largest and 4 smallest influential 
observations following Belsley, Kuh and Welch (1980). The dependent variable is 
underpricing, which is the percentage change in the price between the offer price and the 
first-day closing price. ICSR is the market wide sentiment measure from the Index of 
Consumer Sentiment constructed by University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, 
orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. ANetBuy is the abnormal order flow of 
small investors for IPO on the first trading date after the IPO date. Bubble equals to one if 
the IPO occurs between September 1998 and August 2000, zero otherwise. ICSR*Bubble 
is the product of ICSR and Bubble. ANetBuy*Bubble is the product of ANetBuy and 
Bubble. Revision is the percentage change from the midpoint of the filing range to the 
offer price. Revision+ equals to one if the Revision is positive, zero otherwise. MaxRank 
is the maximum of all the lead managers’ ranks. MaxRank_BF1990 equals to MaxRank 
if the IPO is issued before 1990, zero otherwise. HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is 
in high tech industry, zero otherwise. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by 
venture capitalists, zero otherwise. Nasdaq equals to one if the IPO is listed on Nasdaq, 
zero otherwise. Age is the number of years between the founding year and the IPO year. 
DecShrOffer takes the values from 1 to 10, by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for the IPOs 
in the same year. ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is 
the sales for the prior fiscal year before offering from Compustat, in billion. Year is the 
IPO issue year. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level 
respectively. 
 
  [1] [2] 
  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
ICSR 0.006*** 11.84 0.006*** 7.991 
ANetBuy   0.002*** 7.02 
Revision 0.165*** 4.19 0.250*** 4.92 
Revision+ 1.371*** 12.17 1.281*** 10.37 
MaxRank 0.002 0.94 0.009*** 2.62 
MaxRank_BF1990 -0.010*** -6.78   
HiTech 0.054*** 5.73 0.065*** 5.04 
Venture 0.020** 2.02 0.030** 2.23 
Nasdaq 0.016** 2.02 0.029** 2.31 
Age -0.001*** -4.55 -0.001*** -3.59 
DecShrOffer -0.008*** -3.85 -0.008*** -2.72 
Sales -0.004** -2.17 -0.006*** -2.64 
Year 0.003*** 3.78 -0.001 -0.68 
Constant -5.166*** -3.72 1.510 0.71 
Number of Obs 5190   3468   
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